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The Role Of For-Profit Education In Social Stratification And Social Inequality In 
The United States 
Abstract 
For-profit colleges now enroll about one in ten US college students. Their rapid expansion in the last two 
decades raises several questions about the role that they play in educational inequality. Broadly, this 
dissertation asks whether for-profit colleges help or hinder the students that they serve. I evaluate the 
relationship between for-profit colleges and social mobility at three critical junctures along the pathway 
through college and into young adulthood. First, why do students, in particular those with high levels of 
prior academic achievement, choose to enroll in for-profit colleges? Next, what impact do for-profit 
colleges have on the routes that students take to their bachelor's degree? What impact do these schools 
have on the transfer pathway – the link between two-year colleges and four-year bachelor's degree-
granting schools? Lastly, how do graduates with for-profit bachelor's degrees fare when entering the labor 
market? 
I answer these questions using three nationally representative data sources: one which follows high 
school students as they progress through college (ELS 2002), another that tracks beginning college 
students as they move through school and transition to the workforce (BPS 2004-2008), and a third which 
surveys new bachelor’s degree graduates as they transition into their early careers (B&B 2008-2012). I find 
that all students frequently cite programmatic reasons to justify choosing for-profit colleges, but for high 
achieving students, a lack of individual and familial social capital may help explain why they choose for-
profit education. I also find that two-year college students who begin college at for-profit schools are less 
likely to transfer to four-year colleges, for-profit or otherwise. Even among students who expect to transfer 
to a four-year college, those who start college at for-profit schools are less likely to make this transfer. 
Lastly, I find that Black and Asian-American for-profit bachelor’s degree holders earn significantly less 
than their same-race peers with non-profit degrees. The data suggest that for-profit colleges, narrowly 
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THE ROLE OF FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION IN SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND SOCIAL 
INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
David K. Kirui 
Camille Z. Charles 
Grace Kao 
 For-profit colleges now enroll about one in ten US college students. Their rapid 
expansion in the last two decades raises several questions about the role that they play in 
educational inequality. Broadly, this dissertation asks whether for-profit colleges help or 
hinder the students that they serve. I evaluate the relationship between for-profit colleges 
and social mobility at three critical junctures along the pathway through college and into 
young adulthood. First, why do students, in particular those with high levels of prior 
academic achievement, choose to enroll in for-profit colleges? Next, what impact do for-
profit colleges have on the routes that students take to their bachelor's degree? What 
impact do these schools have on the transfer pathway – the link between two-year 
colleges and four-year bachelor's degree-granting schools? Lastly, how do graduates with 
for-profit bachelor's degrees fare when entering the labor market? 
 I answer these questions using three nationally representative data sources: one 
which follows high school students as they progress through college (ELS 2002), another 
that tracks beginning college students as they move through school and transition to the 






as they transition into their early careers (B&B 2008-2012). I find that all students 
frequently cite programmatic reasons to justify choosing for-profit colleges, but for high 
achieving students, a lack of individual and familial social capital may help explain why 
they choose for-profit education. I also find that two-year college students who begin 
college at for-profit schools are less likely to transfer to four-year colleges, for-profit or 
otherwise. Even among students who expect to transfer to a four-year college, those who 
start college at for-profit schools are less likely to make this transfer. Lastly, I find that 
Black and Asian-American for-profit bachelor’s degree holders earn significantly less 
than their same-race peers with non-profit degrees. The data suggest that for-profit 
colleges, narrowly defined, have had a largely negative effect on social mobility, 
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Over the last few decades, for-profit colleges1 have experienced enormous growth. 
What began as networks of small trade and vocational schools has grown into a $48 
billion a year industry of over 800 institutions nationwide (Beaver 2009), enrolling more 
than 3 million college students across the country (Arbeit and Horn 2017). According to 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2011), enrollment at for-profit colleges 
increased 229% between 1990 and 2010, and the industry now makes up roughly 10% of 
all post-secondary enrollments in the United States. Over the same period, enrollments 
grew 35% at public, not-for-profit institutions, and 38% at private, nonprofit institutions. 
When looking only at institutions that participate in federally funded Title IV student aid 
programs, the percentage change in enrollments is even more noteworthy (see Figure 
0.1). Moreover, for-profit colleges enroll a large number of students from backgrounds 
typically underrepresented in American higher education (e.g., low-income students, non-
traditional students, veterans, etc.) (Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2012). Many of these 
students rely on federal student aid to fund their education. Because of this, for-profits 
generate an estimated three-quarters of their revenue from federal student aid. Moreover, 
for-profits are the beneficiaries of approximately one-quarter of Pell grants and federal 
subsidized and unsubsidized student loans. For-profits also received nearly 37 percent of 
 
1 I define for-profit colleges are defined as institutions that are owned and operated by enterprises that exist 
primarily to generate a taxable profit for their shareholders or private owners (e.g., University of Phoenix, 
DeVry University, etc.). I contrast for-profit colleges with public and private, non-profit colleges and 
universities. Although non-profit institutions are also revenue-generating enterprises, their excess revenue 
is repurposed toward supporting aspects of their mission as non-profit organizations. Some examples of 
private, non-profit institutions: Harvard University, the University of Pennsylvania, University of Southern 
California. Some examples of public, non-profit institutions: University of California, Berkeley, University 







post-9/11 GI Bill education benefits in the program’s first year (Deming et al. 2012; Kutz 
2010; Mettler 2014). Federal student aid money is arguably allocated to disadvantaged 
students to aid their upward mobility. That for-profit colleges are the beneficiaries of a 
disproportionate amount of this money – allocated to promote students' mobility – offers 
a compelling argument in support of understanding how these institutions affect the 
outcomes of their students. It is also important to know how for-profit colleges function 
within a broader system of educational stratification. 
While these schools have existed for the better part of the last 100 years, mostly 
as regional trade and vocational schools, their substantial growth is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. (Kinser 2006; Stevens and Kirst 2015). Their expansion in recent years has 
invited the scrutiny of both government agencies and consumer finance watchdog groups. 
As questions about their student recruitment and business practices, as well as their 
student outcomes and consumption of federal student aid funds, have come to light, they 
have come to occupy a prominent and controversial space in the higher education policy 
landscape. Some accuse for-profits of operating a predatory business model that targets 
vulnerable student populations and leaves them saddled with debt and degrees of little 
value (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2014a; Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, 2014b). Others argue that these institutions are merely filling a need by offering 
a service to those who may not otherwise be able to access a post-secondary education 
(Harding, Rochmes, and Torres 2010). Moreover, for-profits’ growth has spurred 
questions about the role they play in inequality of educational outcomes and social 






The surge in high profile regulatory attention that the industry received in the 
early 2010s was reflective of a harsh regulatory environment from the Obama 
administration that, in part, led the industry into a steep decline (Kamenetz 2015). As 
many scholars note, these schools typically face more stringent regulatory incursions 
under Democratic administrations while experiencing growth under laissez-faire 
Republican administrations that favor their deregulation (Beaver 2009; Kinser 2006; 
Stevens and Kirst 2015). As such, the recent rise and subsequent decline of the industry 
may just be the latest chapter of the ongoing “boom-and-bust” cycle that has 
characterized these institutions for most of their existence (Stevens and Kirst 2015). 
Indeed, signs point to a possible thaw in the government’s relationship with the 
industry under the Trump administration (Cohen 2017; Dynarski 2016). Recent changes 
in the political climate have ushered in a more favorable regulatory environment for for-
profit colleges. History suggests that for-profits may be on the verge of yet another boom 
cycle, which will have wide-ranging implications for the more than 3 million 
undergraduate students estimated to be enrolled in their programs nationwide (Arbeit and 
Horn 2017). This raises questions about the role that these institutions have played and 
will continue to play in processes that affect educational inequality on a broad scale. 
Understanding how these institutions impact disparities in educational outcomes is a 
fundamental first step in gaining insight into the role that they play in social stratification. 
I believe that for-profit colleges are uniquely positioned to study the mechanisms 
that undergird educational stratification and inequality at large. Moreover, they can help 
advance our understanding of how canonical theories of educational expansion, 






higher education. In this dissertation, I inquire about the broad relationship between 
educational stratification and inequality and for-profit colleges. Do for-profit colleges 
help or hinder the students that they serve? How do for-profit institutions operate in the 
tracking, allocating, and socializing functions of higher education? 
To answer these broad questions, this dissertation identifies and explores three 
distinct junctures in the higher education pipeline and transition to adulthood that are 
pivotal in understanding for-profit colleges' impact on their students' social mobility, as 
well as implications for social inequality. This dissertation consists of three stand-alone 
yet sequential and interrelated studies, each of which examines a unique point on the 
pathway through college and into young adulthood. I identify each of these points in the 
college trajectory and transition to adulthood as moments in time upon which mobility 
hinges. Upward or downward forces applied at these stages can have profound 
consequences on the course of an individual's long term educational and social mobility. 
Entry into college is often the first step in the transition to adulthood. 
Consequently, this dissertation will first explore why high school students, in particular 
those with records of high academic achievement, choose to enroll in and attend for-
profit colleges. Many scholars view for-profit students as "low-status" students who have 
limited educational options. However, a non-trivial number of high achieving students – 
presumably with higher status educational options – choose to enroll in for-profit schools. 
This study uses the Educational Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS), a nationally 
representative sample of students who were 10th graders in 2002. ELS monitors these 
students for eight additional years, as they finish high school, go through college, and 






make because it begins tracking its cohort before college and then follows up with them 
as they progress through college. I use ELS to gain insight into the reasons that students 
choose for-profit education, as well as aspects of their social and high school 
environment that may be related to for-profit college enrollment. In doing so, I work to 
give us a better picture of the mechanisms behind this unique form of academic 
undermatch. 
Next, this dissertation explores a vital mechanism for upward mobility during 
college – the transfer pathway between two-year community colleges and four-year, 
bachelor's degree-granting institutions. When functioning optimally, this pathway 
provides a path to a bachelor's degree for less advantaged students, who 
disproportionately attend community colleges. In this study, I examine the functioning of 
this pathway for students who start college at two-year, for-profit schools. The transfer 
pathway provides a unique vantage point along the trajectory through college and can 
shed light on the barriers that can hamper students' mobility toward a degree. For-profit 
colleges are often compared to community colleges – they serve a similar student 
population and offer some similar curricula. In this study, I explore whether there are 
characteristics unique to for-profit colleges that present unique challenges for students 
hoping to use the transfer pathway for upward mobility. To do this, I use the 2004 – 2009 
cohort of the Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study, which followed a 
nationally representative sample of college students through their time in school. BPS is 
optimal for the study of college transfer because it includes a robust array of measures 
relating to transfer between institutions of higher education. In this study, I tie several 






they collectively operate to reinforce inequality at the lowest end of the higher education 
status hierarchy. 
In the last study, I examine the link between college and the world of work. I 
evaluate the labor market outcomes of students who receive their bachelor's degrees from 
for-profit colleges. Early occupational outcomes (i.e., those shortly after getting a 
bachelor's degree) can have profound impacts on an individual's employment outlook far 
down the road (Burning Glass Technologies and Strada Institute for the Future of Work 
2018). Specifically, I examine measures such as for-profit graduates' annual income, 
debt-to-income ratio, employment stability, and employment intensity in comparison 
with their peers who earned their bachelor's degree from non-profit colleges. Although 
many studies have evaluated for-profit graduates' earnings, I aim to examine a broader 
array of measures of a successful transition to adulthood. I did this because I argue that 
narrowly focusing on earnings as a measure of post-grad economic stability misses the 
mark; we need a more detailed metric to fully assess job seekers' transition to the 
workforce. I also disaggregate my analyses on income by race/ethnicity. To do this, I rely 
on the 2008-2012 Baccalaureate & Beyond (B&B) Longitudinal Study, a nationally 
representative longitudinal survey of new bachelor's degree holders who received their 
degrees in the 2007-2008 academic year and were followed up with twice – in 2009 and 
again in 2012. B&B included a wide array of employment-related measures, which 
proved exceedingly beneficial in the study of labor market outcomes. In this study, I 
examine the influence of holding a for-profit degree on a number of labor market 
outcomes at the tail end of the transition to adulthood. Findings suggest that for-profit 






demonstrate this empirically. I also examine the relationship between for-profit 
credentials and race/ethnicity and, in the process, apply two racial and educational 
inequality frameworks to the relationship between race/ethnicity and for-profit 
credentials. 
In sum, this dissertation provides an analysis of how for-profit colleges fit into the 
pathway to and through college and the transition to young adulthood. I believe that the 
relationship between social mobility and for-profit colleges hinges on the three points in 
time that I have identified with each constituent study. Going forward, scholars and 
policymakers looking to conduct work on this topic should look to these three critical 
moments along the pathway through college and the transition to adulthood as a way to 













CHAPTER 1: UNDERMATCHED? WHY HIGH ACHIEVING STUDENTS 
CHOOSE FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION  
ABSTRACT 
 
Why do high achieving high school students choose to attend “low-status” for-profit 
schools when they could attend “higher status” schools? Using the Education 
Longitudinal Study of 2002, a nationally representative survey that tracks a cohort of 10th 
graders for eight years, this study attempts to explain this unique type of academic 
undermatch. Existing theories of educational choice do not adequately explain why these 
students choose for-profit education. I find that students of all achievement levels cite 
programmatic reasons for choosing for-profit education and deprioritize institutional cost 
relative to other factors. Among high achieving high school students, discussing college 
with parents, participation in extracurriculars, and having parents who are active in their 
child's school are all associated with a lower likelihood of choosing for-profit education. 
Findings suggest that a lack of social capital, in the form of students' and parents' 
academic integration, may be a critical factor in determining why high achievers choose 
for-profits. Results suggest that capital returns to status-group participation are not 















 The literature on academic undermatch – the tendency of some students to enroll 
in colleges that have lower entrance requirements than those they could have likely 
attended given their academic credentials – is relatively well-developed. However, I 
explore a type of academic undermatch unique to for-profit colleges that has not been 
well studied. Many for-profit colleges have traditionally been open-admission schools – 
meaning they would admit almost anyone who had a high school diploma or its 
equivalent. Consequently, many scholars and policymakers consider for-profit colleges to 
be of low status. However, data and anecdotal evidence suggest that many students with 
records of high academic achievement enroll in open-admission for-profit colleges when 
their credentials could presumably afford them admittance to more selective colleges and 
universities.  This phenomenon contradicts some conventional theories about institutional 
choice, evinces a novel dimension of academic undermatch which has received little 
attention in extant work, and challenges existing frameworks by which cultural capital is 
transferred across status hierarchies. 
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION AND SIGNIFICANCE 
For-Profit Colleges and Status Hierarchies 
Over the past twenty years, for-profit colleges have become the fastest-growing 
institutions of higher learning in the United States as measured by enrollment (Arbeit and 
Horn 2017; Beaver 2009). Though for-profit entities have existed in education for the 
better part of the last century (Kinser 2006), their fundamental character began to change 
in the mid-1970s – clearing the way for the significant growth of the industry over the 







attend for-profit schools, including "1 in 10 black students, 1 in 14 Latin[x] students, and 
1 in 14 first-generation college students"(Arbeit and Horn 2017; Cottom 2017). While 
there was a decline in for-profit enrollments under the Obama administration, the 
industry seems poised to make a comeback under President Trump (Cohen 2017; 
Dynarski 2016; Kamenetz 2015). Given that for-profit schools disproportionately enroll 
vulnerable student populations (Chung 2012; Gelbgiser 2018; Holland and DeLuca 2016; 
Staklis, Bersudskaya, and Horn 2011) the implications for the rise and sustained 
prominence of these institutions for social stratification and inequality are wide-ranging.  
Scholars most often situate the rise of for-profit colleges within credentialing theory, 
arguing that the growth of these institutions can be explained, at least in part, by a 
demand for educational credentials (Brown 2001; Collins 1971, 1979; Weber 1978). 
Conventional wisdom asserts that for-profit colleges have expanded to satiate an 
increased desire for educational credentials, particularly among lower SES groups 
(Cottom 2017). In turn, acquired educational credentials function as signals to economic 
actors (e.g., future employers) of deserved membership in a given socio-economic strata 
(Bills 2003; Bills and Wacker 2003; Spence 1973, 2002). In a rational choice framework, 
prospective students have a vested interest in maximizing the utility and signaling power 
of their future degrees to become upwardly mobile (Chung 2012; Iloh and Tierney 2014). 
This model works reasonably well in explaining why high achieving students opt for non-
profit colleges with more established records of signaling power, and why low achieving 
students choose any degree (even from a for-profit college) over no degree at all. 
However, it struggles to explain why high achieving students, particularly those of low 







despite seemingly having more attractive options. As sociologist Tressie McMillan 
Cottom notes, she is often asked why students go to "those schools" at academic 
conferences (Cottom 2017:99). With this chapter, I aim to shed more light on this 
question. In particular, I seek to understand why students with records of high past 
academic achievement choose to attend for-profit schools. 
Much of the extant literature on for-profit education presumes that students choose to 
attend these schools because they have few, if any, other higher education options 
(Bennett, Lucchesi, and Vedder 2010; Deming et al. 2012; R. Vedder 2012). However, 
year after year, a significant number of high achieving students who have the academic 
qualifications to attend traditional institutions of higher education opt instead to enroll in 
for-profit colleges. Implicit in much of the extant research on for-profit higher education 
is the assumption that many students who enroll in and graduate from these schools are 
considered "low status" (Chung 2012; Cottom 2017:89; Deming et al. 2012). Moreover, 
many scholars compare for-profit schools to community colleges, which they argue are 
their closest analog because they serve similar student populations (Deming et al. 2012; 
Holland and DeLuca 2016; Iloh and Tierney 2014; Iloh and Toldson 2013).  
 However, empirical data show that students with records of high academic 
achievement regularly opt to attend for-profit schools over traditional non-profit 
institutions of higher education (Cottom 2017:72–72). This suggests that for-profit 
schools do not solely cater to "low-status" students who are shut out of traditional higher 
education, but instead appeal to students with a range of past academic achievements. 
For-profit schools themselves often argue that they serve students that conventional 







consider that almost all for-profit colleges are open-admission2 (meaning that only a high 
school diploma or equivalent is required for admission), a significant proportion of those 
who enroll in for-profit programs would likely be eligible, based on their record of 
achievement, for more selective postsecondary programs. Why then do students that 
presumably have other post-secondary options afforded by their history of high academic 
performance (e.g., "high-status" students) choose to attend for-profit schools, which can 
be significantly more costly and have more tenuous outcomes (Deming et al. 2012; Lang 
and Weinstein 2012), over traditional institutions of higher learning?  
Status Acquisition and Academic Undermatch 
 The term "academic undermatch" was borne from empirical work testing whether 
students who were admitted to elite academic institutions under affirmative action were 
equally qualified (Alon and Tienda 2005; Bowen and Bok 1998; Rodriguez 2013). 
Though its origin may be considered problematic, the term lends a useful conceptual 
framework through which to think about the consequences of college enrollment for 
students of varying levels of academic achievement. Academic undermatch occurs when 
students enroll in colleges which are less selective and less academically rigorous than 
those that they have the academic qualifications to attend (Ann M. Gansemer-Topf, 
Downey, and Genschel 2017; Belasco and Trivette 2015; Rebecca M. Callahan and 
Humphries 2016; R. M. Callahan and Humphries 2016; Lowry 2017; Roderick, Coca, 
and Nagaoka 2011; Rodriguez 2013, 2015; Roksa and Deutschlander 2018; Smith, 
Pender, and Howell 2013; Tiboris 2014). These students, for whatever reason, choose to 
attend schools with lower entrance requirements than those they could have attended 
 







given their credentials. Estimates vary regarding the prevalence of academic undermatch, 
but most recent literature estimates that around 41% of all college students undermatch 
(Smith et al. 2013). Many scholars note that students from lower SES backgrounds are 
more likely to undermatch, as are students of color, urban and rural students, and students 
whose parents lack college degrees (Deutschlander 2017; Hurwitz et al. 2012; Rodriguez 
2015; Smith et al. 2013). Latinx students undermatch at higher rates than Whites but it is 
unclear how undermatch affects Black student populations due to data limitations 
(Roderick et al. 2011; Rodriguez 2015; Smith et al. 2013). Moreover, low SES students 
with similar qualifications as their higher SES peers are less likely to attend college, more 
likely to attend two-year colleges than four-year colleges, and are less likely to apply to 
very selective institutions (Roderick et al. 2011). There is a substantial amount of 
evidence that students who undermatch take longer to graduate, and are less likely to 
graduate from college (Bowen and Bok 1998; Bowen, Chingos, and McPherson 2009; 
Horn 2006; Light and Strayer 2000; Smith et al. 2013). Moreover, Light and Strayer 
(2000) observe that “students of all academic ability levels have a higher probability of 
completing a degree if the selectivity level of the college they attend matches their 
measured academic skill level (248).”  
  There is a consensus among scholars regarding the mechanisms that precipitate 
academic undermatch. Many attribute undermatch to lack of academic preparation, as 
well as a lack of social and cultural capital needed to navigate the college admissions and 
financial aid processes (Roderick et al. 2011; Rodriguez 2015). This specialized 
knowledge has, more recently, been termed “college-specific” cultural capital 







students of color do not have access to the type of specialized knowledge or guidance 
necessary to successfully navigate the college admissions process (Roderick et al. 2011; 
Stanton-Salazar 1997, 2001; Stanton-Salazar and Dornbusch 1995). Moreover, most 
students rely on their parents and broader social network for information and influence on 
college decision-making (Hossler, Schmit, and Vesper 1999; Roderick et al. 2011). 
Students may also lack adequate knowledge of the college planning and the admissions 
process, access to information about college and financial aid, as well as the 
encouragement to translate aspiration into college enrollment (Bowen et al. 2009; 
Roderick et al. 2011). The literature on cultural capital suggests that it relates positively 
to students’ academic success (Lareau 1987, 2000, 2011; Lareau and Weininger 2003; 
Tramonte and Willms 2010). However, scholars cannot agree on whether the ways in 
which cultural capital is acquired reproduces inequality or can, in some instances, 
promotes mobility (Deutschlander 2017). Cultural reproduction theorists argue that 
cultural capital is largely acquired through status group membership – meaning that it is 
rarely possible for those less advantaged to accumulate the capital of more advantaged 
groups (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Deutschlander 2017; Lareau and Horvat 1999; 
Perna 2000; Roscigno and Ainsworth-Darnell 1999). By contrast, some scholars advocate 
for a definition of cultural capital that is obtained through status culture participation, not 
solely status group membership (Deutschlander 2017; DiMaggio 1982). This model of 
cultural capital acquisition, which I will term cultural mobility, allows for the possibility 
of less advantaged individuals acquiring cultural capital later in life via participation in 
various enriching activities (Aschaffenburg and Maas 1997; DiMaggio 1982; Dumais 







undermatch suggests that some aspects of the cultural mobility model are applicable – 
high school students can reduce their likelihood of undermatch by participating in various 
status group activities (e.g., college informationals, financial aid workshops, etc.). 
However, access to those types of enrichment activities is not equitably distributed, 
suggesting that elements of both the cultural reproduction and cultural mobility models 
manifest in circumstances of academic undermatch. 
There is also some evidence that some high school factors such as size, 
urbanicity, racial/ethnic makeup, and district-level spending may influence the propensity 
of undermatch (Hurwitz et al. 2012; Rodriguez 2015). Some argue that high schools can 
institute certain structural supports and policies that can, in effect, help to mitigate 
undermatch (Hurwitz et al. 2012; Roderick et al. 2011). Students in urban high schools 
with a greater proportion of students who apply for the Free Application for Federal 
Student Aid (FAFSA), a prevalence of four-year college-going, where teachers hold 
college-going expectations, and prepare and support students through the application 
process are more likely to apply to and gain acceptance to four-year colleges; these 
students are also more likely to enroll in a college with selectivity levels commensurate to 
their level of achievement (Roderick et al. 2011:202).  
In addition to these school-level effects, there is also evidence that certain peer 
and contextual effects can also contribute to the prevalence of undermatch. Some 
scholars find that regular student involvement in high school extracurriculars is 
associated with a lower likelihood of enrolling in a four-year college that is an 
undermatch (Roderick et al. 2011). This is particularly true for high school students who 







year (Broh 2002; Marsh 1992; Marsh and Kleitman 2005; Quirk, Keith, and Quirk 2001; 
Roderick et al. 2011).  
Aside from requiring a high school diploma or its equivalent, nearly all for-profit 
colleges are non-selective, open-admissions institutions (Deming et al. 2012). Almost any 
student at an open-admission for-profit college with the academic credentials to attend a 
more selective institution can be considered under matched by the generally accepted 
definition. Moreover, for-profits enroll a student population that includes a plurality of 
low SES students, first-generation college students, and people of color – all groups that 
academic undermatch has been shown to disproportionately affect (Cottom 2017; 
Deming et al. 2012; Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2013; Deutschlander 2017; Hurwitz et al. 
2012; Roderick et al. 2011; Rodriguez 2015; Smith et al. 2013).  
Smith et al. (2013) argue that undermatch may be financially beneficial for 
students in certain situations. They speculate that attending a less selective college will 
likely be less expensive, and therefore will be an inexpensive way for some students to 
ascertain whether college is right for them. Those who decide to withdraw will do so 
without excessive student debt, Smith and colleagues argue (Smith et al. 2013:261). They 
concede, though, that we do not yet know much about the relationship between academic 
match, cost, and the likelihood of student success (Smith et al. 2013:261). This model 
may work well for traditional, non-profit colleges – where public and two-year 
institutions are typically less expensive than more selective and private schools. 
However, the argument that academic undermatch may contribute a cost-benefit to 
certain students falls flat when considering for-profit colleges. For-profit colleges 







(DeLuca, Clampet-Lundquist, and Edin 2016; Deming et al. 2012, 2013; Harding et al. 
2010). Moreover, people who attend for-profit colleges hold more student debt, on 
average, than their peers who attend non-profit institutions – regardless of whether or not 
they graduate (Baum 2011; Belfield 2013; Cellini and Darolia 2017; Cottom 2017; 
DeLuca et al. 2016; Deming et al. 2012, 2013; Harding et al. 2010). Linking academic 
undermatch with a financial benefit makes sense when considering traditional two and 
four-year colleges. However, the inclusion of for-profit colleges into this framework 
reveals oversights in previous thought about the linkages between academic undermatch 
and cost. Previous research overstates the degree to which academic undermatch provides 
a financial benefit. Moreover, for-profit colleges problematize any perceived positive 
relationship between academic undermatch and cost. 
The framework of academic undermatch is highly relevant to understanding the 
reasons that high achieving students, in particular, choose open admission for-profit 
education. However, undermatch has yet to be applied in this context. Moreover, the 
undermatch framework could help shed some light on the mechanisms that inform the 
choice of for-profit education among high achieving high schoolers. 
Research Question 
To address the gaps in extant research identified in the previous section, this 
chapter will answer the following question: 
1. What are the factors that influence the choice of for-profit education among 
students with records of high academic achievement? 
DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS 







Data. I use restricted data from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002, a nationally 
representative sample of young people who were 10th graders in 2002. ELS monitors 
these students for eight years - throughout high school, college, and their transition to the 
workplace. ELS is a longitudinal study in which schools and students are sampled 
repeatedly over time; the 2002 cohort was initially followed at two-year intervals.  
ELS:2002 is administered and maintained by the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES) at the Institute for Education Sciences (IES), U.S. Department of Education 
(USDOE). In Spring 2002, the base year of the study, high school sophomores were 
selected to participate from a national sample of high schools. Students were randomly 
sampled within schools. The population of schools included in the sample included 
public and charter schools as well as Catholic and other private schools with 10th grades 
in the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. There were approximately 750 schools 
in the final sample, which yielded about 17,000 sophomores. Their teachers, parents, 
principals, and librarians were surveyed as well. Students’ achievement data in reading 
and mathematics were also collected. ELS oversampled Asian and Latinx students, as 
well as those at private schools.  
Two years later, during the first follow-up, base year students who were still in 
their same schools were surveyed and tested in mathematics. The sample was also 
freshened during this time to make it nationally representative of high school seniors in 
Spring 2004. High school transcripts were collected shortly after the first follow-up. The 
second and third follow-ups were conducted two and eight years after high school 
graduation. The second follow-up, collected in 2006, surveyed sample members using 







also includes administrative data from sources such as the National Student Loan Data 
System and the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) (Ingels et al. 2014a).  
Data for the third follow up were collected between July 2012 and February 2013 
to assess respondents' outcomes regarding persistence, degree attainment, and labor 
market transition. Postsecondary transcripts were also collected as part of the third follow 
up. Data from this wave were supplemented by administrative records from the SAT, 
ACT, General Educational Development (GED), U.S. Department of Education Central 
Processing System (CPS), and the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS). These 
data enable research to be conducted at three levels of analysis: 1) cross-sectional 
profiles, 2) longitudinal study and 3) inter-cohort comparisons with older and more recent 
cohorts of American high school students (Ingels et al. 2014a). For this chapter, I use a 
cross-sectional level of analysis.  
Measures. My response variables were either 1) a measure of the primary reason 
respondents chose to attend their first post-secondary institution, or 2) the college type of 
their first post-secondary institution (i.e., whether or not it was for-profit). For the series 
of models with respondents' primary reason as the response variable, my explanatory 
variable of interest was college type, which was operationalized as the sector of students’ 
first attended post-secondary institution. Respondents were allowed to choose among six 
options that best reflected the primary reason they decided to attend their first post-
secondary institution. They could indicate that they made the choice due to 1) program of 
study, 2) the reputation of the program, faculty, or school, 3) cost, affordability, or 







Although not particularly instructive, I opted to preserve the "another reason" category 
because I did not want to sacrifice any additional cases. 
I also included covariates that measured respondents' race/ethnicity, gender, 
parents' highest level of education, and a composite measure of socioeconomic status. 
The composite measure of socioeconomic status that I used was borrowed directly from 
the original ELS:2002 data. The authors of the ELS:2002 data derived the SES composite 
measure from parent questionnaire data, or imputation and student data when parent data 
were not available. This composite measure is based on five standardized components 
that were given equal weight. These components were: 1) father's/guardian's education, 
2) mother's/guardian's education, 3) family income, 4) father's/guardian's occupational 
prestige score, and 5) mother's/guardian's occupational prestige score (Bozick and Ingels 
2008).3  
I also controlled for the number of academic risk factors respondents encountered 
by 10th grade. This covariate was constructed by the authors of the ELS:2002 data from 
the following six indicators: whether the respondent 1) came from a single-parent 
household, 2) has two parents without a high school diploma, 3) has a sibling who has 
dropped out of school, 4) has changed schools two or more times (excluding those due to 
promotions), 5) has repeated at least one grade, and 6) comes from a household below the 
federal poverty threshold (Ingels et al. 2014b).  
Additionally, I controlled for the percentage of minority students in respondents’ 
high schools, whether they or their parents are non-native English speakers, respondents’ 
 
3 Occupational prestige scores were determined based on the 1961 Duncan socioeconomic index (Bozick 







immigrant status (e.g., first/second generation, etc.) and, the percentage of students 
enrolled in college prep coursework in respondents’ high schools. I included three 
covariates that tease out the mechanisms of parental involvement and social capital: 1) 
whether they discussed college with their parents, 2) if respondents’ parents are involved 
in their school’s parent-teacher organization, and 3) whether they participated in 
extracurriculars in high school. Lastly, I accounted for the number of months between 
when respondents ended high school and began college, whether they had children in 
high school, their high school grade point averages, and standardized composite math and 
reading test scores. These composite test scores were taken from the cognitive tests that 
were administered in the base year of ELS:2002. I chose to use the composite test scores 
instead of more traditional metrics like SAT/ACT because there were fewer missing 
cases to contend with. Population weighted descriptive statistics on all variables can be 
found in Table 1.1. Population weighted quartile distributions on achievement measures 
can be found in Table 1.1a. 
[Table 1.1 about here] 
Model Specification 
 I treated all missing data using listwise deletion. The predictors that measure 
composite test score and high school grade point average were broken down into 
quartiles, in order to better gauge the differences between tiers of achievement. I applied 
analysis weights to compensate for the unequal probabilities of selection into the sample 
and to adjust for bias due to non-response.  
First, I ran a series of multinomial logit models within each of the four quartiles of 







respondents cited for choosing their first post-secondary institution. I also ran the same 
series of models and replaced high school GPA with the composite test score, generating 
one model in each of the four quartiles of composite test scores. This allowed me to get a 
better picture of what respondents valued most when selecting their first college, as well 
as any possible differences across achievement (test score and GPA) quartiles. 
Next, I ran a series of binary logit models estimating the likelihood of enrollment 
in a for-profit post-secondary institution. Estimating these models allowed me to analyze 
the influence of extra-personal factors on respondents’ choice to enroll in a for-profit 
college. Similar to the previous multinomial models, I ran these models within each of 
the four achievement quartiles on both high school GPA and composite test score; this 
yielded a total of eight models. While instructive, these models ran into the problem of 
separation – this was particularly true for models estimated within the fourth quartiles of 
GPA and composite test score. Separation occurs when any number of covariates in a 
logistic regression model perfectly predicts the outcome for most or all observations 
(Cook, Niehaus, and Zuhlke 2018; Firth 1993; Heinze and Schemper 2002; Kosmidis and 
Firth 2011). Separation substantially biases regression coefficients for affected 
covariates, making it difficult to draw valid inference from data in which separation is 
present. David Firth (1993) proposed that separation could be overcome by estimating 
binary logit models using penalized likelihood instead of standard maximum likelihood 
techniques; his conclusion has been validated by later work on the subject (Heinze and 
Schemper 2002). 
To address separation in my maximum likelihood binary logit models, I estimated 







four quartiles of test score using the firth penalized likelihood method, which I describe 
in the previous paragraph (i.e., firthlogit). In addition to addressing missing regression 
coefficients in the models estimated by maximum likelihood, the models that I estimated 
via penalized likelihood also provide a robustness check on the coefficients that are 
estimated via maximum likelihood. To do this, I used the firthlogit package in Stata. 
Unfortunately, the firthlogit package does not accommodate weights when estimating 
penalized likelihood regression equations. Thus, I could not use any analysis weights 
when I estimated the penalized likelihood models. The weighted maximum likelihood 
models that I estimated were useful here because although they contained separation on 
some covariates, those parameters that were present allowed me to judge any loss of 
accuracy that came with being unable to weight the data. Fortunately, there was none.   
Additionally, I calculated propensity scores for these data to use them to mitigate 
selection bias in my data. Once I estimated propensity scores, I employed propensity 
score covariate adjustment to account for selection bias and to further test the robustness 
of my results. Since full-scale propensity score matching methods drop nonmatches from 
the sample, I chose to employ these small sample propensity score methods instead to 
preserve the data. Propensity score covariate adjustment and similar methods are 
recommended by some when a small sample size makes full matching techniques 
imprudent (Guo and Fraser 2009; Holmes 2013; Holmes and Olsen 2010). I used these 
methods with models estimated by maximum likelihood as well as those estimated by 








In total, I estimated one multinomial logit model within each of the four high 
school GPA quartiles with a measure of the primary reason for choosing a school as the 
outcome variable. I also estimated eight sets of binary logit models – one within each of 
the four achievement quartiles on both high school GPA and composite test score. This 
yielded a total of thirty-two binary logit models, and thirty-six models when the 
multinomial models were included. I only report on differences that reach a minimum 
statistical significance of p < .10. I estimated the binary logit models using penalized 
likelihood to address issues of separation that were evident when results were estimated 
via maximum likelihood (see Appendices 1.A and 1.B). I display the results of the 
multinomial logit and penalized likelihood binary logit models in Tables 1.2 through 1.4. 
I present all results as odds ratios (i.e., e(β)).  
Achievement-related heterogeneity in the adjusted effect of college type on the primary 
reason for attendance.  
Table 1.2 displays the results of the multinomial logistic regressions predicting 
primary reason for school choice within each of four achievement quartiles on high 
school GPA. In each case, the reference category on the dependent variable is those 
students who cite cost as the primary reason they chose their first-enrolled post-secondary 
institution. Within each of the four achievement quartiles, students at for-profit colleges 
are shown to be significantly more likely to have cited “program of study” than “cost” as 
the primary reason they chose to enroll in their first post-secondary institution. Moreover, 








For-profit college students in the lowest achievement quartile were predicted to be 
about 14 times more likely (p < .001) to choose their first college mainly for its program 
of study than considerations related to cost, when compared to their peers at non-profit 
colleges with similar achievement levels (OR: 15.20). For-profit college students in the 
lowest achievement quartile were also significantly more likely (p < .05) to cite the 
school’s reputation, not its cost, as the main reason for choosing it compared to their 
peers at non-profit colleges. These students were about eight times more likely than their 
non-profit college peers to cite their school's reputation instead of its cost as the primary 
reason they chose to attend it (OR: 9.229). 
[Table 1.2 about here] 
For-profit students in the second achievement quartile were also significantly 
more likely (p < .001) to report having chosen their school primarily for its program of 
study rather than its cost, compared to their non-profit peers. Students who attend for-
profit schools were predicted to be about 30 times more likely (OR: 31.83) to have 
chosen their college mainly for its programmatic offerings than its cost. Notably, this is 
the largest effect size for all four achievement quartiles. These students were also 12 
times more likely (OR: 13.32; p < .01) to have chosen their college for its reputation than 
its cost. Students at for-profit colleges were also about four times more likely (OR: 5.279; 
p < .10) to say that they chose their school primarily due to personal reasons rather than 
cost. Students at for-profit schools were also significantly more likely (OR: 6.742; p < 
.05) to report that they chose their college for "another reason" as opposed to basing their 







Students who fall in the third achievement quartile are also about 16 times more 
likely (OR: 16.59; p < .001) to have chosen their school for programmatic reasons rather 
than financial reasons if they attend a for-profit college. These students are also about 
four times more likely (OR: 5.073, p < .05) to say that they have chosen their college due 
to its reputation rather than cost. For-profit college students are about 80% less likely 
(OR: .194; p < .10) to have chosen their school primarily due to its location compared to 
its cost than their peers at non-profit schools. For-profit college students are also almost 
seven times (OR: 7.606; p < .05) more likely to have cited “another reason” for choosing 
their school rather than cost, compared to their peers at non-profit schools.  
The highest achieving students (i.e., those that fall in the fourth and highest 
achievement quartile) were also significantly more likely (p < .05) to have chosen their 
college for programmatic reasons than financial considerations if they attend a for-profit 
college. Though significant, it is notable that the magnitude and level of significance of 
this difference is lowest among the highest achieving students. For-profit college students 
are nearly eight times (OR: 8.762) more likely to have chosen their college primarily for 
programmatic reasons than cost, compared to their peers at non-profit colleges. Aside 
from programmatic reasons, no other reasons for attendance are significantly related to 
college type among the highest achievers. By contrast, in the three lowest-achieving 
quartiles, reasons for attendance other than those that are program-related are 
significantly related to college type. 
Although these results are instructive of the many reasons that students choose to 
enroll in for-profit colleges, perhaps they are the most indicative of the fact that when it 







considerations above an institution's cost. To be sure, the highest achieving students who 
enroll in for-profits are less likely to prioritize other reasons above cost than their lower-
achieving peers (as evidenced by comparing the magnitude and significance of the 
coefficients relative to the base category across quartiles). However, even the highest 
achievers who attended for-profits were more likely to prioritize a college's program of 
study above its cost. 
Achievement-related heterogeneity in the adjusted likelihood of for-profit college 
enrollment related to high school experiences.  
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 display the results of binary logit models predicting the 
likelihood of enrollment in a for-profit college based on several extra-personal factors. 
Due to issues with separation in the models that were estimated via maximum likelihood, 
I also estimated a series of models via penalized likelihood. Stata does not allow the use 
of weights when estimating models via penalized likelihood. I include the results of the 
models estimated via maximum likelihood as a robustness check – to evaluate whether 
those parameters estimated via penalized likelihood (without survey weights) aligned 
with the weighted parameters. The results from the unweighted penalized likelihood 
models closely aligned with the results of the weighted maximum likelihood models. 
This suggests that, in this case, probabilistic weighting procedures may not be necessary 
for valid outcomes. I also ran separate models within achievement quartiles on high 
school GPA and composite test score. 
Among students in the top half of the test score achievement distribution (third 
and fourth quartiles), some common extra-personal factors affected the likelihood of 







maximum likelihood (see Appendix 1.A), students in the top half of the test score 
achievement distribution who discussed college with their parents during high school 
were significantly less likely to enroll in a for-profit college. In the third achievement 
quartile, students who had discussed college with their parents were about 86% less likely 
(OR: .141; p < .01) to enroll in a for-profit college than their peers who had not discussed 
college with their parents while in high school. The highest achieving students (i.e., those 
in the fourth achievement quartile) who discussed college-going with their parents in high 
school were nearly 90% less likely (OR: .102; p < .10) to enroll in for-profit colleges than 
their peers who did not have these conversations with their parents while in high school. 
The effect of discussing college with parents was not present in the lowest-achieving 
quartile. 
In addition to having discussed college with their parents while still in high 
school, other aspects of high achieving students' high school experience appear to have a 
bearing on their likelihood of enrolling in a for-profit college. In models estimated via 
maximum likelihood, students who scored in the fourth quartile whose parents were 
involved in their school's parent-teacher organization (PTO) were nearly 60% less likely 
(OR: .411; p < .10) to enroll in for-profit colleges than their academically similar peers 
whose parents were not involved in the PTO. Students in the top three-fourths of the test 
score distribution who participated in extracurricular activities in high school were also 
significantly less likely to enroll in a for-profit college. Students that fell in the second 
test score quartile who were involved in extracurriculars during high school were about 
48% less likely (OR: .516; p < .05) to enroll in for-profit colleges than their academically 







test score quartile were about 80% less likely (OR: .202; p < .001) to enroll in for-profit 
colleges than their peers in the same quartile who were not involved in high school 
extracurriculars. The highest achieving students (i.e., those that were in the fourth test 
score quartile) that participated in extracurriculars in high school were about 72% less 
likely (OR: .282; p < .05) to enroll in for-profit colleges than their high achieving peers 
who did not. Among students in the lowest-achieving test score quartile, high school 
extracurricular participation, and for-profit college enrollment were not significantly 
related.  
Although the maximum likelihood models suffer from validity issues due to 
separation, the penalized likelihood models yielded similar results to them. When 
estimating the model parameters by penalized likelihood (Table 1.3), students in the top 
half of the test score distribution who discussed college with their parents while still in 
high school were significantly less likely to enroll in for-profit colleges than their peers 
who did not – a result that mirrors the maximum likelihood models. Students in the third 
test score quartile who discussed college with their parents while in high school are about 
86% less likely to enroll (OR: .135; p < .001) in for-profit colleges than their peers in the 
same quartile who did not. The highest achieving students (i.e., those in the fourth 
quartile) who discussed college with their parents while in high school were about 81% 
less likely to enroll (OR: .191; p < .10) in a for-profit college than their similarly 
achieving peers who did not.  
[Table 1.3 about here] 
Unlike the model estimated via maximum likelihood, the penalized likelihood 







quartile whose parents are involved in a parent-teacher organization and the likelihood of 
their enrollment in a for-profit college. Like the maximum likelihood model, students in 
the top half of the test score distribution are significantly less likely to enroll in for-profit 
colleges if they have participated in extracurriculars in high school. In this case, students 
in the third quartile were 76% less likely (OR: .240, p < .001) to enroll in for-profits and 
their peers in the highest achieving quartile were about 62% less likely (OR: .381, p < 
.05) to enroll in for-profits. Results on this measure differ from the maximum likelihood 
model among the lowest-achieving students, who, in the penalized likelihood model, are 
also less likely to enroll in for-profits if they've participated in extracurriculars in high 
school. Those in the lowest test score quartile who participated in high school 
extracurriculars are about 45% less likely (OR: .549; p < .05) to enroll in for-profit 
colleges than their peers who did not. 
When measuring academic achievement by high school grade point average, the 
results are fairly similar to the models that use composite test scores as a measure of 
academic achievement. In the model estimated via maximum likelihood (see Appendix 
1.B), high achieving students (i.e., those in the fourth test score quartile) who attended 
high schools with a greater percentage of 10th graders in college prep courses were 
significantly less likely to enroll in for-profit colleges than their peers attending schools 
with a lower percentage of college prep course enrollment. Among students with high 
school grade point averages in the fourth quartile, each percentage point increase in 10th-
grade enrollment in college prep coursework at their high school is associated with a 
2.1% decrease in the likelihood of enrollment in for-profit colleges (OR: .979; p < .01). 







who had discussed college with their parents were significantly less likely to enroll in for-
profit colleges. These students were about 88% less likely (OR: .118; p < .001) to enroll 
in for-profit colleges than their academically similar peers who hadn't discussed college 
with their parents. Students whose high school grade point averages were in the second 
and fourth quartiles were significantly less likely to enroll in for-profit colleges if their 
parents attended their high school's parent-teacher organization meetings. The highest 
achieving students (i.e., those in the fourth GPA quartile) with parents involved in their 
school's PTO were 68% less likely (OR: .320; p < .10) to enroll in for-profit colleges, 
while their peers in the second GPA quartile were about 52% less likely (OR: .477; p < 
.05) to enroll in for-profit colleges. 
Similar to other models, extracurricular participation is associated with a decrease 
in the likelihood of for-profit college enrollment among the top three quartiles. The effect 
is largest for students in the third quartile of high school GPA – they are about 85% less 
likely (OR: .154; p < .001) to enroll in for-profits than their peers in the same quartile 
who did not participate in high school extracurriculars. The highest achievers (i.e., those 
in the fourth quartile) are about 76% less likely (OR: .242; p < .05) to enroll in for-profits 
if they participated in high school extracurriculars. Students who had high school GPAs 
in the second quartile were about 40% less likely (OR: .599; p < .10) to enroll in for-
profits if they participated in high school extracurriculars.  
When estimating the parameters via penalized likelihood and measuring 
achievement by high school GPA, the results are largely consistent with the maximum 
likelihood GPA model. The results of this model can be found in Table 1.4. The highest 







likely to enroll in for-profits the higher the percentage of students in college prep 
coursework in their high school (OR: .981; p < .01). Moderately high achieving students 
(i.e., those in the third GPA quartile) were about 85% less likely (OR: .146; p < .01) to 
enroll in for-profits if they had discussed college with their parents. In a departure from 
the GPA model estimated via maximum likelihood, when estimating via penalized 
likelihood, there is a large positive effect among the highest achieving students who have 
children (OR: 17.04; p < .10) – meaning that these students are much more likely to 
enroll in for-profits if they have children. Moreover, the highest achievers (i.e., those in 
the fourth GPA quartile) are about 59% less likely (OR: .406; p < .10) to enroll in for-
profits if their parents attended PTO meetings. Like previous models, students in the top 
half of the GPA distribution are significantly less likely to enroll in for-profits if they 
participated in extracurriculars in high school. Students in the third GPA quartile were 
77% less likely to enroll (OR: .229; p < .001) in for-profits if they participated in high 
school extracurriculars. The highest achievers (i.e., those in the fourth quartile) were 
about 65% less likely to enroll (OR: .352; p < .05) in for-profits if they participated in 
high school extracurriculars.  
[Table 1.4 about here] 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
On their face, my results suggest that high achievers may be drawn to for-profit 
colleges because they perceive the programs of study offered to be more suitable to their 
needs than those offered by traditional institutions. This is often an argument made to 
explain why traditional community colleges are losing students to for-profit two-year 







achieving students (those in the fourth quartile on GPA or test score) are less likely to 
choose for-profits primarily for their programmatic offerings than their peers with a 
record of lower academic achievement (e.g., !!" <	!!#…	!!$). Moreover, some 
research suggests that analysis of college choice that does not account for institutional 
pull-factors is becoming more myopic in an era when even traditional non-profit schools 
rely on increasingly unconventional methods to attract students (California Association of 
Private Postsecondary Schools 2017; Lederman 2015; R. K. Vedder 2012).  
Recent research may shed more light on the reasons why so many students who 
end up enrolling in for-profit colleges cite programmatic reasons as their main motivating 
factor. This work suggests that many for-profit colleges design their recruitment 
processes and present the benefits of enrolling "in a way that capitalizes on [the] 
anxieties, stress, and fear" of low SES and lower-achieving students (Deil-Amen, 
Campbell, and Gjerde 2019). Specifically, there is evidence suggesting that many for-
profit colleges aggressively and explicitly market their programmatic offerings as 
flexible, fast, and leading to lucrative employment opportunities in a way that uniquely 
appeals to lower SES students (Anon 2019). These types of marketing practices and 
pressure tactics may be directly related to why students who enroll in for-profits cite 
programmatic reasons as the primary reason they chose to enroll. 
Among high achievers, several interesting patterns emerged in the results – some 
of which are consistent with extant literature on academic undermatch, cultural capital, 
and status acquisition. Results suggest that parental involvement, peer and contextual 
effects, and school effects all play a role in the likelihood that high achievers enroll in 







robust impact on the likelihood of for-profit college enrollment. Across all of my models, 
students who participated in extracurricular activities in their senior year of high school 
were significantly less likely to enroll in for-profit colleges. This finding is consistent 
with much of the extant literature that suggests that extracurricular participation reduces 
the likelihood that high school students will undermatch (Broh 2002; Covay and 
Carbonaro 2010; Marsh 1992). Moreover, the effect that extracurricular participation has 
on for-profit college enrollment can be viewed as an instance of peer, school, and 
contextual effects, as well as an instance in which status group participation translates to 
the acquisition of cultural capital (as evidenced by the lower likelihood of undermatch).  
To disentangle the peer, school, and contextual effects at play and explore the 
exact mechanisms that undergird the effect of extracurricular participation, more fine-
grained data are needed. Moreover, the literature suggests that the effect of 
extracurricular participation on undermatch is particularly strong for students who 
participate in sports-based extracurriculars. Unfortunately, these data do not allow me to 
explore what types of extracurricular activities are driving this effect. Nevertheless, this 
finding suggests that the mechanisms that contribute to undermatch among students who 
attend traditional (non-profit) colleges may parallel those that contribute to undermatch 
among students who attend for-profit colleges. If we view extracurricular clubs and 
activities as analogous to status groups, this finding also supports the argument that 
cultural capital can be acquired through status group participation, not solely group 
membership. 
After extracurricular participation, the effect of having college discussions with 







fall in the upper half of the achievement distribution are less likely to enroll in for-profit 
schools if they report having discussed college with their parents while in high school. 
This effect is significant or marginally significant (i.e., p < .10) in each of the models that 
I present in this chapter. These results suggest that parental involvement and engagement 
in the college-going process, net of parents' education level, may play a role in the 
likelihood of a student to enroll in a for-profit college. This finding complicates existing 
scholarship that argues that parents' educational background matters more when it comes 
to undermatch than how engaged they are in their children's college selection process, 
indicating instead that parental engagement matters just as much, if not more, than 
parental education levels. 
Moreover, students whose parents attend meetings of their school's parent-teacher 
organization (PTO) are less likely to enroll in for-profit colleges. This finding adds 
another dimension to the link between status group participation, cultural capital, and 
academic undermatch. If we consider parent-teacher organizations as analogous to status 
groups, the relationship between parents' PTO participation and students' likelihood of 
for-profit college undermatch suggests that students are not the only actors for whom 
status group participation can yield cultural capital. Moreover, if we consider this finding 
simultaneously with the finding that students whose parents discussed college with them 
are less likely to attend for-profits, a link can be envisioned between parents' status group 
participation and their children's cultural capital acquisition. This linkage implies that 
parents acquire cultural capital through status group participation, which they then pass 
on to their children through involvement with and engagement in their college-going 







profit enrollment among high achievers. Higher SES students were less likely to enroll in 
for-profits only if they were among the highest achievers. SES did not have the same 
effect on lower achievers or even those in the second-highest achieving quartile. This 
suggests that the impact of SES on this particular form of undermatch (i.e., for-profit 
undermatch) is not uniform even among high achievers and complicates existing work 
implying that the effect of SES on undermatch is relatively constant. 
In addition to the previous findings, school composition may have an impact on 
students’ likelihood of enrolling in for-profit colleges. Among the highest achievers (i.e., 
those in the fourth quartile), there is some evidence that the percentage of 10th graders 
enrolled in college preparatory courses at a student's high school is significantly related to 
a student's likelihood of enrolling at a for-profit college. The higher the percentage of 
students enrolled in college prep coursework, the lower the likelihood that a particular 
student at that high school will go on to enroll in a for-profit college. These results imply 
that contextual, school, and peer effects impact the likelihood of for-profit undermatch 
among high achieving students. The higher the percentage of college prep courses offered 
at a school, the more likely that a high achieving student and/or their peer group will be 
enrolled in them. This finding implies that there may be some peer effects at work in this 
particular type of undermatch among high achievers. Alternatively, we can consider 
college preparatory courses as status groups and high achieving students as members of 
those status groups. Although college preparatory courses are not status groups in the 
traditional, familial sense, their barriers to entry (e.g., demonstrated academic 
achievement) are more rigid than would be acceptable under a model in which status 







Taken together, my results suggest that status group participation, while an 
effective conduit of mobility for some students, does not benefit students of all 
achievement levels.  In these data, only high achieving students reap the benefits of status 
group participation. Students with lower records of academic achievement who 
participate in status group activities are not less likely to go on to undermatch at a for-
profit college (i.e., acquire college-specific cultural capital), while their high achieving 
peers are. For high achievers, the model of cultural capital acquisition consistent with 
status group participation seems to predominate, while their lower-achieving peers seem 
to exist within a more rigid framework that is more akin to status group membership. 
This can be interpreted as evidence that the cultural reproduction framework plays a more 
prominent role than the cultural mobility framework in conceptualizing the link between 










CHAPTER 2: A BROKEN PATHWAY? TRANSFER STUDENTS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL MOBILITY AT FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES 
ABSTRACT 
 
The transfer pathway – which allows for transfer between community colleges and four-
year colleges – plays a critical role in upward mobility and degree attainment for many 
students. Students at two-year for-profit colleges, however, face a unique set of 
challenges when trying to gain access to this pathway. Using data from the 2004-2009 
wave of the Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study, a nationally 
representative sample of students who began college during the 2003-04 school year, I 
explore the functioning of the transfer pathway from two-year, for-profits to four-year 
colleges. I find that students who begin college at two-year for-profit schools are less 
likely to transfer to four-year colleges, non-profit or otherwise, successfully. Moreover, 
even among students who started college expecting to transfer to a four-year school, 
those that attended for-profits were less likely to make this transfer within six years of 
starting college. I argue that this represents a "cooling out" of students' expectations via 
an interplay between macro-level allocation theories, and micro-level socialization 
theories of status attainment. Social forces operating within and outside of for-profit 











 The transfer pathway – described by scholars as the link between two-year, 
community colleges, and four-year bachelor's degree-granting institutions – has the 
potential to be a pathway for upward mobility. This is particularly true for students of low 
SES and from underrepresented racial backgrounds, who are disproportionately 
represented at two-year, community colleges (Bowen et al. 2009; Carnevale and Strohl 
2010; Jenkins and Fink 2015). However, while about 80 percent of community college 
students intend to transfer, only 20 percent do. Moreover, only 17 percent go on to 
complete their bachelor’s degree (Horn and Skomsvold 2011; Jenkins and Fink 2015; 
Shapiro et al. 2013). Some scholars have suggested that community colleges may 
gradually lower their students' expectations through a process referred to as "cooling out" 
(Alexander, Bozick, and Entwisle 2008; Clark 1960). There is some evidence suggesting 
that there are notable barriers to transfer between two-year, non-profit colleges, and four-
year colleges (Cottom 2017; Iloh and Tierney 2014). Most of the work on the transfer 
pathway focuses on community colleges; there is little extant work on the relationship 
between for-profit colleges and the transfer pathway. Understanding how for-profit 
colleges contribute to the transfer pathway will help us understand how the transfer 
pathway functions for some of the most disadvantaged student populations in higher 
education (Cottom 2017; Deming et al. 2012). Moreover, the transfer pathway operates at 
a critical juncture for mobility in higher education and can shed light on the socializing, 
allocating, and legitimating functions of education and stratification. 







For-Profit Colleges, the Transfer Pathway, and Upward Mobility 
Transferring between schools, from a community college to a state university, for 
example, is a core pathway by which students (particularly those who are low-income, 
first-generation, and/or otherwise underrepresented) progress through higher education 
(Gandara et al. 2012). This linkage, which is known in the literature as the transfer 
pathway, often refers to the upward trajectory from two-year community colleges (or 
other associate-degree granting institutions), to a four-year institution and onward to a 
baccalaureate degree (Gandara et al. 2012; Handel and Williams 2012; Hodara et al. 
2017; Wang, Chuang, and McCready 2017). Indeed, research suggests that “transfer from 
community colleges to four-year institutions offers a critical avenue for upward mobility 
[particularly] for many underrepresented students”(Jenkins and Fink 2015:1). Whether or 
not this pathway functions as intended is debated in the literature (Alba and Lavin 1981; 
Gandara et al. 2012; Handel and Williams 2012), but the role that for-profit colleges play 
in it is often overlooked (Bailey, Badway, and Gumport 2003). It is this step in the 
pathway that I will focus on in this chapter. Though there are certainly cases of students 
transferring either laterally, from non-profit four-year colleges to for-profit four-year 
colleges (see Goldrick-Rab 2016:183), or vertically from public, non-profit community 
colleges to bachelor's degree-granting for-profit colleges, a critical juncture4 for upward 
mobility for students enrolled in two-year programs at for-profit colleges is the link 
between these programs and four-year bachelor's degree-granting non-profit institutions. 
 
4 I refer to this link as a crucial juncture because the literature suggests that graduates that hold bachelor's 
degrees from non-profit institutions are preferred on the job market and can command higher earnings than 
those from for-profit institutions (Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2012), and occupational mobility is key to 







This is especially important because the majority of students enrolled in for-profit 
colleges are enrolled in programs that are two-years or less in length (Cottom 2017; 
Deming et al. 2012). Moreover, there is general agreement in the literature that there are 
significant disparities in transfer rates between disadvantaged community college 
students and their more advantaged peers (Dougherty 1987; Dougherty and Kienzl 2006; 
Goldrick-Rab and Pfeffer 2009; Lee and Frank 1990; Velez and Javalgi 1987). While 
cleavages by SES in the rate of transfer at non-profit, community colleges are perhaps 
unsurprising, there is a dearth of work on how the transfer pathway from two-year to 
four-year colleges is further complicated by the intersection of class and college type 
(i.e., profit status of institutions).  
Although there is an established literature on transfer pathways within non-profit 
institutions (Calcagno et al. 2008; Goldrick-Rab 2006; Handel and Williams 2012; 
Hodara et al. 2017; Long and Kurlaender 2009; Rosenbaum, Deil-Amen, and Person 
2007; Wang et al. 2017), there is little that explicitly addresses the transfer pathway 
running from for-profit, two-year institutions to non-profit, four-year institutions. 
Moreover, the scholarship on for-profit institutions that does pay explicit attention to 
inter-sectoral pathways is mainly qualitative and/or descriptive (Bailey et al. 2003; 
Cottom 2017; Goldrick-Rab 2016:183; Iloh and Tierney 2014)5. Some literature places 
emphasis on the fact that community colleges and for-profits vie for students with similar 
academic and socio-demographic profiles (Holland and DeLuca 2016; Iloh and Tierney 
2014; Iloh and Toldson 2013). While this is undoubtedly true, it belies the fact that 
 
5 Although Goldrick-Rab (2016) showcases work that relies on both quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies, I refer here specifically to the interview excerpt and ethnographic notes that span pages 182 







transfer pathways between sectors, and specifically from two-year, for-profit to four-year, 
BA-granting non-profit schools, serve an essential function in determining the role that 
for-profit colleges play in persistence and degree attainment. 
Fundamental precepts governing the existence and viability of the transfer 
pathway for inter-institutional vertical mobility are what is known in higher education 
and policy circles as articulation agreements. According to the literature, articulation 
agreements function to “negotiate the requirements for students’ movement from 
institution to institution and support the transfer intent”(Cottom 2017:149; Anderson et 
al. 2006). Articulation agreements are, in effect, contractual agreements between two 
higher education institutions wherein both institutions agree to recognize as valid course 
credits that are transferred between them (Anderson et al. 2006; Bailey et al. 2003; 
Cottom 2017). For-profit colleges have many articulation agreements in place with public 
community colleges (Bailey et al. 2003; Cottom 2017), but these agreements rarely 
govern relationships between for-profit, two-year institutions, and non-profit, four-year 
BA-granting institutions (Bailey et al. 2003; Cottom 2017). Because of this, transferring 
course credits to BA-granting institutions proves difficult for many students at two-year 
for-profits; this is particularly true at for-profit institutions that lack regional 
accreditation6 (Bailey et al. 2003). To be sure, there are valid arguments that articulation 
agreements are chiefly about maintaining curricular and instructional quality, especially 
because many BA-granting, four-year non-profit institutions have concerns about 
 
6 Regional accreditation is considered the gold standard of higher education accreditation. Institutions that 
are regionally accredited are typically academically oriented, non-profit, and set minimum curricular 
quality standards, facilitating credit transfer. By contrast, institutions that are nationally accredited are 







instructional quality at for-profits (Bailey et al. 2003; Cottom 2017). However, in 
practice, the lack of credit transferability acts as an additional impediment to upward 
transfer mobility for some of the most vulnerable student populations in higher education. 
These students often enroll in for-profit two-year colleges unaware that they may be 
unable to transfer the course credits they earn to non-profit institutions and/or apply them 
to earn a bachelor's degree. Moreover, there is evidence that admissions counselors at for-
profit schools mislead students about the transferability of credits earned at their school 
(Kutz 2010). This lack of credit transferability acts as a de facto barrier to upward 
institutional mobility, increases time to degree, and (often) personal and educational 
expenditures. Moreover, barriers such as this, that are often unforeseen may discourage 
some students from continuing their education. Indeed, empirical work shows that the 
issue of credit transferability plays a role when students are choosing between for-profit 
and non-profit institutions7 (Iloh and Tierney 2014). However, using this information to 
choose between institutions requires a level of bureaucratic and institutional 
knowledge/savvy (i.e., capital) that students considering to enroll in for-profit colleges 
may not have access to. 
The literature on the transfer pathway from two-year for-profit schools to non-
profit BA granting institutions is sparse. Since this point in the path is particularly 
relevant for degree attainment and upward mobility, additional research on it is of 
particular interest to sociologists of education and stratification scholars. The impact of 
incongruence in transfer protocols, in practice, prevents fluid cross-sectoral mobility and 
 
7 This requires a level of bureaucratic and institutional knowledge/savvy that not all vulnerable student 
populations possess; moreover, the technicalities of credit transferability may not be an issue that for-profit 







may further dampen the educational outcomes of students who attend for-profit schools. 
Moreover, policies governing transfer may have an indirect impact on post-degree 
earnings/discretionary income since students at two-year for-profit schools accumulate 
significantly more student debt, and students that can transfer more credits can complete 
their degrees faster (resulting in a lower total debt burden) (Belfield 2013:7; Cellini and 
Darolia 2017). Most extant work on the transfer pathway has focused on non-profit 
community colleges, and the role that they play in the transfer pathway; very little has 
looked at the relationship between for-profit institutions and the transfer pathway. 
Moreover work that has made this distinction, has focused on transfers from community 
colleges to for-profit schools (Liu and Belfield 2014). Since for-profit institutions confer 
more associate’s degrees than bachelor’s degrees (Bailey et al. 2003) and earning an 
associate’s degree is a critical step for many toward earning a bachelor’s degree, work 
that further explores this particular aspect of the transfer pathway is an instructive way to 
expand the corpus of knowledge on social mobility and for-profit colleges, as well as 
within higher education more broadly. More work is needed to understand the 
mechanisms that undergird the transfer pathway for students who first enroll at for-
profits. This work will help us gain more insight into the relationship between for-profit 
colleges, degree completion, and social mobility, as well as a more nuanced 
understanding of the mechanisms that encourage or inhibit movement within the higher 
education landscape. 
Persistence theory suggests that students who begin college at a two-year 
community college and seek a bachelor's degree encounter three distinct barriers to 







must successfully progress through their first semester of college. Next, students must 
successfully transfer to a four-year, bachelor's degree-granting institution. Finally, 
students must complete their bachelor's degree. Although transfer and persistence are 
often thought of as distinct, there is substantial overlap, and some scholars argue that 
transfer should be considered a form of persistence in institutions of higher education 
(Crisp and Nuñez 2014; Hagedorn, Cypers, and Lester 2008). 
Vincent Tinto (1975, 1993) offers perhaps the most comprehensive and widely 
cited framework for thinking about issues of persistence, degree attainment, and 
withdrawal from higher education. Drawing heavily from sociologist Emile Durkheim, 
Tinto argued that withdrawal from higher education could be seen as a case of elective 
departure from a communal network (Melguizo 2011; Tinto 1975, 1993). He argued that 
previous work on attainment had placed an onus on individual deficits without giving due 
consideration to how institutions may contribute to adverse outcomes. To this point, he 
argues that previous work on persistence and attainment focused too narrowly on 
describing educational outcomes without focusing on the underlying mechanisms that led 
to completion, persistence, and withdrawal. Though Tinto's work is not without flaw, 
particularly in thinking about community college students and those from 
underrepresented groups (Crisp and Nuñez 2014; Deil-Amen 2011; Schuetz 2005; 
Tierney 1992), he does call attention to the influence that macro-level and structuralist 
mechanisms can have on micro-level educational outcomes. Scholars of college 
persistence and transfer have increasingly relied upon Nora's (2004) student/institution 
engagement model (Arbona and Nora 2007; Crisp and Nora 2010, 2010; Kraemer 1995). 







between the student and their institution when conceptualizing transfer and similar 
educational outcomes. Transfer among two-year college students can best be 
conceptualized as an amalgam of these two conceptual approaches. For-profit colleges, in 
particular, provide a unique vantage point for studying the role of structural and 
institutional forces at play in transfer, persistence, and mobility within college. 
Cooling Out, Degree Expectations, and For-Profit Colleges 
In the sociological tradition, community colleges and other sub-baccalaureate 
institutions have been thought, by some, to play a “cooling out” role (Alexander et al. 
2008; Clark 1960). Clark (1960) argued that junior colleges serve a cooling out function 
in higher education in that they operate to massage the expectations of their students 
downward and facilitate their gradual disengagement from higher education. Brint and 
Karabel (1989) argue that community colleges route students away from transferring to 
four-year colleges by "convinc[ing them] that their talents do not permit them to rise 
further in the educational system" (224). Clark (1960) suggests that "cooling out" works 
to resolve a "conflict between open-door admission [at community colleges] and 
performance of high quality," which produces "a wide discrepancy between the hopes of 
entering students and the means of their realization" (571). 
While whether and the degree to which two-year community colleges play this 
role has been debated (Alba and Lavin 1981; Alexander et al. 2008), for-profit, two-year 
colleges prove to be a unique medium to study the veracity of the “cooling out” 
framework. The distinction between for-profit, two-year colleges, and non-profit, 
community colleges offers a window into how tracking, stratification, and expectation 







community colleges do indeed produce a modest "cooling out" effect (Alba and Lavin 
1981). Scholars are mixed on the mechanisms that undergird the “cooling out” 
phenomenon – with traditionalists arguing that socialization theory explains how cooling 
out “massages” students’ expectations (Alba and Lavin 1981; Clark 1960; Kerckhoff 
1976; Meyer 1977). Viewing cooling out as an instance of socialization theory minimizes 
the role of the institution (i.e., school) in the cooling out process. Notably, Clark (1960) 
emphasized the role of guidance counselors in lowering students’ expectations of 
themselves. Others argue for a more macro, institutionalist perspective in which 
allocation theory explains how community colleges divert students through course-taking 
and tracking (Alba and Lavin 1981; Kerckhoff 1976; Meyer 1977). Those who see 
cooling out as an instance of allocation theory point to the role of institutional obstacles 
that work to cool students out.  
Students' aspirations and expectations are often seen as micro-level processes that 
significantly influence educational attainment (Melguizo 2011; Morgan 2005). Scholars 
generally agree that students' aspirations and expectations play some role in their 
educational outcomes, though the nature and extent of their impacts on status attainment 
is debated (Duncan, Featherman, and Duncan 1972a; Sewell, Haller, and Ohlendorf 
1970; Sewell, Haller, and Portes 1969; Sewell and Hauser 1972). The Wisconsin model 
of status attainment provided an early blueprint for thinking about how individual-level 
motivation is influenced by aspirations, and how, in turn, motivation engenders 
educational attainment (Kirui and Kao 2018; Melguizo 2011; Morgan 2005; Sewell et al. 







Scholars have often distinguished educational aspirations and educational 
expectations. While many agree that expectations matter, much of the extant literature 
has found little to no effect of aspirations on achievement and educational outcomes 
(Hanson 1994; Kao and Tienda 1998; Mickelson 1990). Recent empirical work suggests 
that the relationship between aspirations and academic outcomes is mitigated by 1) 
students’ expectations, and 2) alignment between aspirations and expectations. Indeed, 
when investigating the relationship between student expectations and academic 
outcomes, scholars have found it to be measurable and consistent (Bozick et al. 2010; 
Khattab 2015; Portes et al. 2010). Much of the empirical literature has investigated this 
relationship at the primary and secondary levels, but it can arguably be extended to the 
linkages between students’ aspirations, expectations, and academic outcomes at the 
tertiary level too (Kirui and Kao 2018).  
Whether for-profit colleges cool out their students’ expectations remains to be 
seen. Some may point to higher attrition rates at for-profit colleges as an instance of 
cooling out (Bailey et al. 2003; Deming et al. 2012). However, to determine whether an 
institution has a cooling out effect, it is important to know the educational aspirations and 
expectations of its students. To gauge whether or not students' expectations have, indeed, 
been "massaged" downward over time, it is necessary to know their baseline 
expectations. Although it has been empirically demonstrated that some aspects of the 
"cooling out" framework, could conceivably apply to non-profit, community colleges 
(Alba and Lavin 1981), less is known about its applicability to similarly situated, for-
profit institutions. The lack of credit transferability between two-year, for-profits and 







increase time to degree and, in some instances, may even encourage withdrawal among 
some students.  
Articulation agreements, which are formal contracts between colleges that govern 
the transferability of credits between institutions, govern, for example, whether a four-
year college will accept course credits completed at a two-year college. These formal 
agreements can play a central role in the seamless facilitation of upward transfer across 
institutions. Conversely, these agreements - or, more precisely, the lack of them between 
colleges – can inhibit the functioning of the transfer pathway as a vehicle for cross-
institutional upward mobility. Indeed, recent research has found that “fewer than 60 
percent of community college students were able to transfer most of their credits [to four-
year colleges], and about 15 percent transferred almost no credits” (Jenkins and Fink 
2015:3; Monaghan and Attewell 2015). The inability to transfer credits between 
institutions has measurable ramifications for persistence and degree completion.  
Scholars have found that "students who transferred almost all of their community college 
credits were [two and a half] times more likely to earn a bachelor's degree than students 
who transferred fewer than half of their credits" (Jenkins and Fink 2015:3; Monaghan and 
Attewell 2015). Moreover, among the twenty-five percent of non-profit, community 
college students who transfer, “sixty-two percent go on to earn their bachelor’s 
degree”(Jenkins and Fink 2015:2). To be sure, the lack of formal acknowledgments of 
credit reciprocity is not exclusive to two-year, for-profits, and four-year, non-profits 
(Jenkins and Fink 2015). However, credit transferability does vary substantially by 
college type, with students transferring to non-profit, private colleges successfully 







profit, public colleges. Moreover, college students transferring credits to for-profit 
colleges, were successful at transferring fifty-two percent fewer credits than their peers 
who transferred to non-profit, public colleges (Jenkins and Fink 2015; Simone 2014). 
Research suggests that among transfer students, Black and Latinx students, students with 
poor academic performance, and/or fewer credits at community colleges were more likely 
than their peers to transfer to for-profit colleges than non-profit colleges (Jenkins and 
Fink 2015; Liu and Belfield 2014). Moreover, college students who transfer to for-profit 
colleges are less likely to complete their bachelor’s degrees than their peers who transfer 
to non-profit colleges (Jenkins and Fink 2015; Liu and Belfield 2014). Research suggests 
that students who transfer to for-profit colleges earn less than their peers who transfer to 
non-profit schools (Jenkins and Fink 2015; Liu and Belfield 2014). 
Disparities in transfer rates and credit transferability across college type beg the 
question as to what mechanisms undergird them. I argue that by inhibiting credit 
transferability and extending time to degree, articulation agreements act as a de-facto 
structural mechanism which encourages cooling out among for-profit college students. 
Moreover, this mechanistic cooling out function serves as an instance of allocation theory 
whereby "people in modern societies are allocated to adult roles on the basis of…types of 
education, apart from anything they have learned in school." Thus, "education [functions 
as a] a selector, sorter, and allocator" (Blau and Duncan 1967; Duncan, Featherman, and 
Duncan 1972b; Kerckhoff 1976; Meyer 1977:58–59). Moreover, this sorting function 
played by for-profit colleges and articulation agreements “socializes [students] to accept 








To address the gaps in extant research identified in the previous section, this 
chapter asks the following questions: 
1. Among students who began college at two-year schools, does origin college type 
influence the likelihood that they transfer to non-profit, four-year colleges? 
2. Among students who began college at two-year schools, does origin college type 
influence the likelihood that they transfer to any four-year college? 
3. Among students who began two-year colleges planning to transfer to four-year 
colleges, does origin college type influence the likelihood that they do? 
DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS 
Data and Measures. 
Data. I use data from the 2004-2009 wave of the Beginning Postsecondary Students 
Longitudinal Study (BPS), which followed a nationally representative sample of 
approximately 16,6008 first-time college students who began college during the 2003-04 
academic year, for six years. The data were collected in three waves, the first of which 
was taken from the 2004 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) and the 
subsequent two from the 2006 and 2009 BPS follow up field tests. All three waves of 
data consisted of both interviews with participants as well as data gleaned from an 
internet portal that was made available for participants. The study collected data on 
several outcomes, including student persistence and attainment in college as well as 
transition to the workforce. Moreover, BPS includes many variables that attempt to 
 
8 The U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) does not allow for 
the reporting of the exact sample sizes of its restricted datasets. Therefore, all reported sample sizes in this 







measure persistence toward degree and degree attainment, as well as measures of 
academic achievement, and socio-demographic factors. 
The target population for BPS was beginning college students (referred to as 
"first-time beginners” (FTB)) who began college at post-secondary institutions in the 
United States and Puerto Rico in 2004. The BPS 2004-2009 sample originally consisted 
of 18,610 eligible students; when data collection completed, there were approximately 
15,160 respondents with enough data to be considered study participants. Moreover, the 
response rate among students eligible to participate in the sample was 82%, and it 
reached 90% among respondents who were successfully located after the first round of 
data collection (Wine, Janson, and Wheeless 2011). The study respondents represented 
3,030 post-secondary institutions, from which transcripts were also requested. Of these, 
87% of institutions provided transcripts for study participants. In addition to participant 
interviews and institutional transcripts, a range of data was collected from the U.S. 
Department of Education's Central Processing System (CPS), the National Student Loan 
Data System (NSLDS), and the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) (Wine et al. 
2011). These data are optimal to study transfer patterns among students because they 
include several measures related to students' transfer pathways. 
Measures. My response variables measure the likelihood of transferring from a two-
year college to either 1) a four-year non-profit BA granting institution, or 2) any four-
year BA granting institution (non-profit or for-profit). I estimate separate models for each 
of these outcomes. I also estimate the likelihood of transferring to a four-year BA 
granting institution among students at two-year colleges who planned to do so when they 







vertical upward transfer (i.e., transfer from a two-year to a four-year college) among 
students who began college at two-year institutions. First, I modeled this probability 
among two-year college students who transferred to a non-profit, four-year school. 
Second, I modeled this probability among all two-year college students who transferred 
to a four-year school, regardless of whether or not their destination institution was for-
profit. Finally, BPS asked two-year college students whether they intended to transfer to 
four-year colleges when they began school in 2003-04. Among students that said they 
planned to transfer to four-year colleges when they started at two-year schools, I modeled 
the probability that they made this transfer within six years of starting college (i.e., by 
2009). For all of my models, my explanatory variable of interest was college type, which 
was operationalized as the for-profit status of students' first-attended post-secondary 
institution. In all cases, this institution was a two-year college. 
Additional covariates that I included as controls can be divided into five substantive 
areas. First, I controlled for demographic characteristics such as gender, race/ethnicity, 
and status as a first-generation college student. Next, I accounted for pre-college factors 
such as high school grade point average (GPA), high school mathematics course taking, 
whether students earned college credit while in high school, whether participants had 
delayed enrollment in college after they graduated from high school, and the highest 
degree that students expected to earn when they began college. Then, I account for a 
range of environmental pull factors that influence educational persistence and attainment. 
These environmental pull factors include a categorical measure of the number of hours 
worked per week when students began college in 2004, a measure of whether or not they 







categorical measure of the total amount of financial aid that students received when they 
began college, and whether or not they had assumed part-time student status at any point 
while in school. Lastly, I included explanatory variables centering on students' college 
experiences. These measures included whether students expressed plans to transfer to a 
four-year college when they began college at a two-year school (this measure was 
included as a covariate in two of three sets of nested models and the basis for exclusion in 
the third set). Measures also include academic integration, which was an index derived by 
BPS that included measures of 1) participation in study groups, 2) contact with faculty, 3) 
meeting with an academic advisor and 4) talking to faculty outside of class (Crisp and 
Nuñez 2014; Wine et al. 2011). I also accounted for whether students took any remedial 
coursework during their first year of college, and whether they took any distance 
education courses during their first year. Covariates that I have chosen to include here are 
consistent with theoretical and empirical work on academic retention and transfer 
mobility in college (Crisp and Nuñez 2014; Rendón, Jalomo, and Nora 2004; Wang 
2009). Population-weighted descriptive statistics on all variables can be found in Table 
2.1. 
[Table 2.1 about here] 
Model Specification 
I treated all missing data using multiple imputation. Observations were missing on 
the following variables: 1) High School GPA (20% missing), 2) HS Math Course taking 
(16% missing), 3) Earned college credit while in HS (16% missing), 4) Academic 







First, I ran a series of four nested binary penalized likelihood firth logistic 
regressions estimating the likelihood of vertical upward transfer among students at two-
year colleges. I employ penalized likelihood models here, known as the “firth” method, 
because of their suitability for estimating logistic models on data with “rare” events (i.e., 
data with a “small number of cases on the rarer of the two outcomes”) and their similarity 
to another method proposed earlier for the same problem (Allison 2012; Firth 1993; King 
and Zeng 2001; Leitgöb 2013).  In these data, transfer of any kind was much rarer among 
for-profit students than their non-profit peers – the number of transfer students that 
originated at non-profit colleges was about 24 times larger than their peers who began at 
for-profit colleges. Upward transfer among students who originated at for-profit colleges 
was even more rare – dwarfed by about 65 times compared to upward transfer among 
their peers who began college at two-year non-profit schools. 
This series of models estimated the likelihood of vertical transfer among students 
who made a transfer. By “vertical” transfer, I mean the “level or quantity of education 
received (number of years or highest degree)” (Barry and Barry 1992; Bogart and 
Murphey 1985; Charles and Bradley 2002; Cohen and Brawer 1996; Gerber and Cheung 
2008:300; Hungar and Lieberman 2001). This vertical dimension of stratification is 
contrasted with the horizontal dimension, which is defined in the literature as “the 
different types or quality of education received at a particular level [of 
education]”(Gerber and Cheung 2008:300). Specifically, my response in these models 
measured the direction (e.g., upward, lateral/downward) of respondents' first transfer 
between schools within six years of when they began college in 2003-04. I recoded this 







upward under my newly generated revised measure. Conversely, immediate downward, 
delayed downward, immediate lateral, and delayed lateral transfers were all considered 
downward. Students who never transferred were excluded from the analysis sample; this 
is important to note because it means that the results presented in the first two sets of 
models (Tables 2.2 and 2.3) underestimate the true likelihood of transfer among all 
students. Moreover, for my first set of models, I restricted the analysis sample to only 
those students who began college at two-year schools (i.e., less-than-two year and four-
year institutions were excluded). The outcome variable on this model then became a 
dichotomous measure: where 1 represented students who made immediate or delayed 
upward transfers and 0 represented students who made immediate or delayed downward 
or lateral transfers.   
In measuring the direction of transfer, BPS defines an immediate transfer as one 
that occurred within five months of leaving the origin institution. Conversely, BPS 
considered a transfer that occurred more than five months after leaving the origin 
institution to be delayed. BPS considered an upward transfer to be a transfer to a higher-
level institution (e.g., from two-year to four-year, or from less-than-two year to two-
year). In contrast, BPS defined a lateral transfer as a transfer to an institution at the same 
level (e.g., two-year to two-year, etc.), and a downward transfer as a transfer to a lower 
level institution (e.g., two-year to less-than-two year, etc.) (Wine et al. 2011). By 
restricting my analysis sample to just students who began college at two-year schools and 
excluding students whose first transfer destination institution was for-profit from these 
nested models, an upward transfer in the context of these analyses became a de facto 







Next, I ran a series of four nested Firth logit models estimating the likelihood of 
transferring to any four-year college, regardless of whether it was for-profit, among 
students who began college at two-year institutions and had at least one recorded transfer. 
These models were identical to the first set of nested models, except for not including a 
rule that restricted the type of first transfer destination to non-profit (as was done with the 
first set of models). The dichotomous outcome remained the same as the set of models 
described in the previous paragraph. However, since students whose first transfer 
destination institution was for-profit were included in this set of nested analyses, an 
upward transfer in this context became a de factor transfer to any four-year college, 
whether non-profit or for-profit. 
Lastly, I ran a series of four nested penalized regression logit models estimating 
the likelihood of transferring to any four-year college, regardless of profit-status, among 
those students who began college at two-year schools and expressed to BPS surveyors 
that they planned to transfer to a four-year school when asked at the beginning of their 
college careers in 2003-04. These models address the following question: Among 
students who begin college at two-year schools with the intent to transfer to four-year 
institutions, what is the likelihood that they will make this transfer within six years (i.e., 
the BPS tracking period)? For this series of models, the response variable was a measure 
of whether or not respondents had transferred to a four-year institution by 2009. This 
series of nested models included all of the covariates included in the other sets of 
analyses described in the previous paragraphs, except a measure of whether students 
planned to transfer to a four-year college when they began school.  I estimated all of 







does not allow accommodate weights when estimating penalized likelihood regression 
equations. Post-estimation measures of goodness of fit and predictive power were 
estimated using the firthfit package in Stata. 
RESULTS 
All in all, I estimated 12 Firth penalized likelihood logistic regression models. I 
only report differences that reach a minimum statistical significance of p < .10. 
Moreover, all beta coefficients are exponentiated, so odds ratios are displayed (i.e., 
exp(β)). 
Heterogeneity by college type in the adjusted likelihood of transferring to a four-year, 
non-profit college, among transfer students originating at two-year colleges. 
 Table 2.2 displays the results of a series of four nested penalized logistic 
regressions predicting the likelihood of transfer to a four-year, non-profit school among 
transfer students originating at two-year colleges. I group covariates into four categories. 
First, in Model 1, I account for demographic characteristics.  Next, Model 2 accounts for 
pre-college factors in addition to demographic characteristics. Model 3 considers 
environmental pull factors in addition to pre-college and demographic factors. Lastly, 
Model 4 includes measures of respondents' college experiences as well as all of the 
covariates in the previous models. All four nested models predict that students who begin 
their college careers at two-year for-profit schools are significantly less likely (p < .001) 
than their peers at two-year non-profit schools to transfer to four-year non-profit schools.  
 According to Model 1, which accounts for race/ethnicity, gender, and first-
generation college student status, students at two-year for-profit colleges are about 79 







within six years than their peers at two-year non-profit colleges. Model 2, which accounts 
for pre-college factors such as high school GPA, high school math course-taking, earning 
college credit during high school, delaying enrollment in college, and educational 
aspirations in addition to demographic measures, suggests that students at two-year, for-
profit schools are still significantly less likely (p < .001) to transfer to four-year, non-
profit schools than their peers who attend two-year, non-profit schools. Model 2 predicts 
that once pre-college factors are accounted for, for-profit two-year students are about 
73% less likely (OR: .269) to transfer to non-profit, four-year colleges than their peers at 
two-year, non-profit schools. Model 2 represents an approximately 6% increase in the 
likelihood that for-profit two-year college students will transfer to non-profit four-year 
colleges over Model 1. Model 3 incorporates measures of environmental pull factors, 
such as hours worked while in college, dependency status, financial aid received, and 
enrollment intensity, in addition to covariates from Models 1 and 2. Model 3 suggests 
that students at for-profit two-year colleges are about 75% less likely (OR: .248; p < 
.001) to transfer to four-year non-profit colleges than their peers who began college at 
two-year non-profit schools. After college experiences are taken into account in Model 4, 
students who begin college at two-year for-profit schools are predicted to be about 69% 
less likely (OR: .310; p < .001) to transfer to a four-year, non-profit college than their 
peers who began at two-year non-profit schools. Measures of model fit suggest that 
Model 4 fits the data the best. The negative effect of beginning college at a for-profit 
school on your odds of transferring to a four-year, non-profit is very stable in each model, 
and remains highly significant after accounting for a host of factors that influence 







 Figure 2.1 plots the predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals, derived 
from Model 4, of transfer from a two-year college to a four-year, non-profit college. The 
probability of transfer to a four-year, non-profit school from a two-year, non-profit school 
is predicted to be .638 (95% CI: UCL = .656; LCL = .620). In contrast, the probability of 
transfer to a four-year, non-profit college among students who started college at a for-
profit, two-year school is predicted to be .394 (95% CI: UCL = .503; LCL = .285). The 
difference in predicted probability between students who start at two-year, non-profits, 
and their peers who start at two-year, for-profits is .244, with those who began at non-
profit colleges having a higher predicted probability of transfer. Moreover, the 95% 
confidence intervals for non-profits and for-profits do not overlap; there is a difference in 
probability of .117 between the lower confidence limit for non-profit colleges and the 
upper confidence limit for for-profit colleges. Moreover, differences in conditional 
probability estimates are highly significant (p < .001) 
Heterogeneity by college type in the adjusted likelihood of transferring to any four-year 
college, among transfer students originating at two-year colleges. 
 Results from a series of nested regressions predicting the likelihood of 
transferring to any four-year college, regardless of whether it is for-profit or non-profit, 
among transfer students originating at two-year colleges are displayed in Table 2.3. 
Control variables are grouped into the same four categories as in the previous series of 
models: demographic characteristics, pre-college factors, environmental pull factors, and 
college experiences; these groups are added to the nested models in the same sequential 
order as in the previous set of models. All four nested models predict that students who 







.001) than their peers at two-year non-profit schools to transfer to either type of four-year 
school (i.e., for-profit/non-profit). After accounting for race/ethnicity, gender, and first-
generation college student status, Model 1 predicts that students who begin college at 
two-year for-profits were about 71% less likely (OR: .295; p < .001) to transfer to any 
four-year college, non-profit or for-profit, than their peers who began college at two-year 
non-profits.  
After controlling for demographic characteristics and pre-college factors, Model 2 
suggests that students who started at two-year for-profit colleges were 61% less likely 
(OR: .390; p < .001) to transfer to any four-year college than students who began college 
at two-year non-profits. The likelihood of for-profit students to transfer to any four-year 
college increases by about 10% once pre-college factors are accounted for by Model 2. 
Model 3, which also takes environmental pull-factors into account, predicts that those 
who began college at two-year for-profits are about 63% less likely (OR: .367; p < .001) 
to transfer to any four-year school than their cohort mates who began at two-year non-
profit colleges. Model 4 incorporates the full battery of covariates, including college 
experiences, to predict the likelihood of transfer from two-year colleges to any four-year 
college. Model 4 predicts a 56% decrease in the likelihood (OR: .439; p < .001) of 
transferring to any four-year college among students at two-year for-profits, compared 
with their peers at two-year non-profits. Model 4 represents a 7% increase in the 
likelihood of transfer among for-profit students over Model 3 and a 5% increase over 
Model 2. Model 4 fits the data the best, according to various measures of fit. Similar to 







of for-profit college attendance on the likelihood of transfer is both highly stable and 
highly significant.   
 Conditional probabilities and 95% confidence intervals predicting the likelihood 
of transfer to any four-year college by two-year school type, which are derived from 
Model 4, are plotted in Figure 2.2. The probability of transfer from a two-year non-profit 
to any type of four-year college is predicted to be .617 (95% CI: UCL = .635; LCL = 
.599). This probability among for-profit two-year college students is predicted to be just 
.439 (95% CI: UCL = .530; LCL = .348). There is a predicted .178 difference in 
probability of transfer to any four-year school between two-year, non-profit college 
students and their peers at for-profit schools. Confidence bands around the predicted 
values of these conditional probabilities do not overlap; there is a .069 difference between 
the lower confidence limit for two-year, non-profit students and the upper confidence 
limit for two-year, for-profit students. Moreover, differences in conditional probability 
estimates are highly significant (p < .001) 
Heterogeneity by college type in the adjusted likelihood of transfer to a four-year 
college among students originating at two-year colleges who initially planned to make 
this transfer. 
 Table 2.4 displays the results of a set of nested penalized likelihood logistic 
regressions predicting the odds of transfer to any four-year college among two-year 
college students who planned to transfer to a four-year school when they began college. 
These models address the question of whether for-profit two-year colleges “cool out” 
students by lowering their expectations of upward transfer to four-year BA granting 







race/ethnicity, gender, and first-generation college student status, predicts that if students 
who planned to transfer to a four-year college began school at a two-year, for-profit, their 
odds of making that transfer within six years were about 64% lower (OR: .361; p < .001) 
than their peers with identical transfer plans from two-year, non-profit colleges. After 
accounting for pre-college factors in addition to demographic characteristics, Model 2 
estimates that for-profit two-year students with plans to transfer to a four-year college are 
about 52% less likely (OR: .482; p < .01) than their equally aspirational peers at two-year 
non-profit institutions to do so. Model 2 predicts an approximately 12% increase in the 
odds of transfer among for-profit students compared to the estimates in Model 1. Model 2 
is also notable because it is the only probability model that I present in this chapter in 
which the p-value for for-profit college students does not meet the a = .001 threshold.  
Model 3 accounts for environmental pull factors, in addition to pre-college 
factors, and demographic characteristics. The odds of transfer to any four-year college are 
estimated to be about 64% lower (OR: .364; p < .001) among two-year, for-profit college 
students than their peers at two-year, non-profit schools, according to Model 3. Model 3 
represents about a 12% decrease in the odds of transfer among two-year, for-profit 
college students, compared to Model 2. Model 3 estimates a very similar effect as Model 
1. When college experiences are taken into account, in Model 4, two-year for-profit 
college students were about 66% less likely (OR: .342; p < .001) to transfer to a four-year 
college than their peers at two-year non-profit schools. Model 4 fits the data the best. 
Like all of the previous models, Models 1 through 4 suggest that the negative effect of 
for-profit college attendance on the likelihood of transfer is both highly stable and highly 







 Conditional probabilities and 95% confidence intervals predicting the likelihood 
of transfer to any four-college among two-year college students who planned to do so 
when they began college are plotted in Figure 2.3. These predicted probabilities were 
derived from Model 4. The probability of transfer among students at two-year, non-profit 
colleges is predicted to be .395 (95% CI: UCL = .410; LCL = .379). At .203, the 
probability of transfer among students at two-year, for-profit colleges is predicted to be 
.192 lower than it is for their peers at non-profit, two-year colleges. The lower confidence 
limit for students at two-year, for-profit colleges is .133, and the upper confidence limit 
for these students is .272. Confidence bands around the predicted values of these 
conditional probabilities do not overlap; there is a .107 difference between the lower 
confidence limit for two-year, non-profit students and the upper confidence limit for two-
year, for-profit students. Moreover, differences in conditional probability estimates are 
highly significant (p < .001) 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
To recap, I find that 1) among two-year college students who transfer, those 
students originating in for-profit colleges are significantly less likely to successfully 
make an upward transfer to four-year, non-profit colleges than their peers who start 
college at non-profit, community colleges. Moreover, I also find that 2) this effect is not 
only true among two-year for-profit students attempting to transfer to non-profit, four-
year colleges. Rather, for-profit two-year college students are significantly less likely to 
transfer to any type of four-year college, whether non-profit or for-profit. Perhaps the 
most compelling finding is 3) among students who planned to transfer to a four-year 







schools were significantly less likely to do so within six years of enrolling in college than 
their peers who began at non-profit, two-year community colleges. In other words, 
among students who indicated that they planned to transfer to four-year colleges, their 
likelihood of following through on this plan within six years of starting college was 
significantly lower if they started college at a for-profit school rather than a community 
college. This is notable because it is evidence of the cooling out of expectations among 
for-profit college students (Alexander et al. 2008; Clark 1960). Moreover, population-
weighted descriptive statistics presented in Table 2.1 suggest that students who start 
college at two-year, for-profit schools already have lower degree expectations than their 
peers who start at two-year, community colleges.   
This fits with previous work that suggests that for-profit college attendance has a 
negative impact on persistence and degree completion (Gelbgiser 2018). This also fits 
with the theoretical literature suggesting that some colleges serve a “cooling-out” 
function through which the expectations of highly ambitious yet underachieving students 
are gradually lowered (Clark 1960). In thinking about higher education and inequality at 
a macro-level, Sigal Alon (2009) argues that when competition for college admissions is 
low, access to higher education expands, and inequality declines. My findings provide 
evidence complicating this argument at a micro-level of analysis. For-profit schools are 
largely open admission and generally enroll students of lower SES than their non-profit 
counterparts (i.e., they fit Alon’s definition of “non-competitive and inclusive”) (Cottom 
2017; Deming et al. 2012, 2013). My results suggest that at a micro-level, for-profit, two-
year schools are associated with a decreased likelihood of transfer to bachelor's degree-







college. This decreased likelihood of transfer ultimately leads to a reduced chance of 
bachelor's degree attainment. Decreased likelihood of transfer and bachelor's degree 
attainment would lead to inequality in educational outcomes that is effectively 
maintained, at best, and expanded, at worst (Alon 2009; Lucas 2001).  
This “cooling out” function, it seems, may operate here to maintain or increase 
inequality, as Lucas (2001) posits, rather than decrease it. The fact that even among two-
year college students who expected to transfer to a four-year school, those who attended 
for-profits were less likely to transfer, is in line with the “gradual disengagement” that 
Burton Clark argued was a hallmark of his “cooling out” theory (Clark 1960:575). That 
is, lower transfer rates, particularly among those who originally expected to do so, are 
indicative of a gradual series of steps through which "a goal may be stalled," and which 
ultimately may persuade an individual to "give up peacefully"(Clark 1960:575).  
What about for-profit colleges results in students' lowering their expectations? I 
argue that articulation agreements and credit transferability (more accurately, the lack 
thereof) may play a substantial role in this process. Rules inhibiting credit transferability 
serve as a structural barrier to vertical fluid transfer, especially among student 
populations that may lack the capital necessary to research issues of credit transferability 
before enrolling in college. The inability of students to transfer course credits for which 
they have worked extends their time to degree and may diminish their expectations of 
transfer and degree completion. Although I have shown that a lack of credit 
transferability across types of institutions plays a significant role in stalling students' 
educational trajectories, I believe that articulation agreements play an important role in 







of curricular and instructional quality across institutions. Maintaining curricular quality is 
particularly important regarding the modern for-profit college sector, which has long 
been accused of sub-standard instructional quality (Baird, Carter, and Roos 2019; 
Howarth and Stifler 2019). However, some work to quantify the impact of articulation 
agreements on the likelihood of transfer has found them not to be beneficial (Anderson et 
al. 2006). Articulation agreements are not inherently problematic but operate in this 
instance as a de facto barrier to vertical upward transfer and, by extension, mobility 
among for-profit college students. Perhaps these agreements are only indicative of a more 
significant issue regarding institutional mismatch and instructional standards that requires 
a more systemic intervention to address. 
In summary, I argue that for-profit, two-year colleges act to “cool out” students’ 
expectations for transfer via articulation agreements and policies governing the 
transferability of course credit. Moreover, this cooling out function serves as an example 
of a structuralist instance of allocation theory, whereby students are “allocated to adult 
roles [based on] … types of education” (Kerckhoff 1976; Meyer 1977:58–59). That is 
only part of the picture. I also argue that cooling out regarding credit transferability also 
occurs through more micro-level interactions within for-profit colleges, consistent with 
socialization theory. Similar to Clark's (1960) argument that guidance counselors play a 
central role in cooling out students' expectations, I observe that for-profit admissions 
counselors function in similar ways, particularly concerning counseling prospective 
students about course credit transferability. An undercover investigation conducted by the 
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that admissions 







other things, course credit transferability (Kutz 2010). In at least one case, this involved 
admissions counselors providing inaccurate information about the transferability of 
course credits or withholding information altogether. I argue that this represents an 
instance of cooling out via socialization theory, in which admissions counselors at for-
profit two-year colleges act at as a socialization mechanism within the school to massage 
students’ expectations downward – convincing them to enroll in a college that may 
hamper their long term expectations of transferring to a four-year college and, ultimately, 
earning a bachelor’s degree (Kerckhoff 1976).  
Ultimately, both macro-level institutional processes, such as articulation 
agreements, and micro-level interactional processes, such as admissions counselors, can 
act to cool out students' expectations. An argument can be made that perhaps these two 
processes function in a symbiotic, reciprocal manner – students' expectations are initially, 
often unknowingly lowered by admissions counselors, and ultimately this cooling out is 
codified at a structural level by agreements governing credit transferability across 
institutions. Perhaps the test case of for-profit colleges illustrates the shortcomings of 
both the allocation and socialization theories of status attainment; indeed, it seems as if 
both processes may operate together and even depend on one another. The amalgam of 
these two theories serves to advocate for the application of Meyer's (1977) legitimation 





CHAPTER 3:  DEGREES OF DISPARITY: RACE, DEBT, AND LABOR 




 Using the 2008-2012 wave of the Baccalaureate & Beyond Longitudinal Study, a 
nationally representative sample of young adults who earned a bachelor’s degree in 2008 
and entered the labor market soon after, I examine differences in labor market outcomes 
among graduates of for-profit and non-profit bachelor’s degree-granting schools in the 
United States. Overall, I find that for-profit bachelor’s degree holders do not earn less 
than their peers with non-profit credentials. However, Black and Asian-American for-
profit bachelor’s degree holders earn less than their same-race peers with non-profit 
bachelor’s degrees. I also find that those with for-profit credentials were more likely to 
experience short-term employment instability, have higher average student debt to 
income ratios, and were more likely to be underemployed. I argue that employers 
sanction Black and Asian-American for-profit degree holders with earnings penalties in 
direct response to the interaction between race and degree status.  I also argue that 






Nearly three million American college students are enrolled in for-profit colleges 
and enrollments have more than doubled in the past decade (Cottom 2017). In 2012, 10% 
of all bachelor’s degrees granted in the US were granted by for-profit colleges; moreover, 
for-profit colleges dominate in granting bachelor’s degrees to African-Americans 
(Cottom 2017; Walsh 2015). As more Americans are earning degrees from for-profit 
schools and entering the labor market, scholars have begun to wonder what, if any, 
implications this has for social stratification and inequality (Cellini and Chaudhary 2014; 
Darolia et al. 2015; Deming et al. 2016, 2012; Denice 2015; Lang and Weinstein 2012). 
Some have tried to isolate the effect of for-profit attendance and graduation on income 
inequality and have defined income inequality as observed differences in gross income 
(Cellini and Chaudhary 2014; Darolia et al. 2015; Deming et al. 2016, 2012; Denice 
2015; Lang and Weinstein 2012). 
Income rarely captures the full picture of financial well-being in the US, 
particularly for recent graduates who completed their education in a time when student 
debt, currently around $1.5 trillion, has surpassed credit card debt and auto loans to 
become the second-highest consumer debt category in the US (Friedman 2018). 
Graduates of for-profit colleges, in particular, have borne the majority of this burden; 
research suggests that, on average, for-profit graduates hold more student debt than their 
non-profit peers (Baum 2011; Belfield 2013; Cellini and Darolia 2017; Cottom 2017; 
Deming et al. 2012, 2013; Harding et al. 2010). Research should take student debt into 







particularly when it comes to for-profit colleges. Continuing not to do so runs the risk of 
underestimating the impact that for-profit colleges have had on social stratification and 
inequality. 
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION AND SIGNIFICANCE 
For-Profit Colleges and Labor Market Outcomes 
Published scholarship on for-profit colleges, to date, has mainly focused on the 
labor market and occupational outcomes of their graduates (Cellini and Chaudhary 2014; 
Darolia et al. 2015; Deming et al. 2016, 2012; Denice 2015; Lang and Weinstein 2012). 
Moreover, until recently, sociologists paid little attention to for-profit colleges (Denice 
2015; Deterding and Pedulla 2016; Gelbgiser 2018; Holland and DeLuca 2016). 
Recently, however, sociologists have begun to study for-profit colleges, the students they 
enroll, and the labor market and occupational outcomes that they afford their graduates 
(Cottom 2017; Darolia et al. 2015; Denice 2015; Deterding and Pedulla 2016; Gelbgiser 
2018; Holland and DeLuca 2016).  
Scholars, regardless of disciplinary affiliation, who have endeavored to 
understand the relationship between college type and labor market/occupational 
outcomes, have often sought to do so in one of two ways. First, those interested in micro-
level interactional processes that govern employers’ assessment of for-profit credentials 
have primarily relied upon experimental methods (e.g., audit studies) (Pager 2003, 2007) 
to get at these questions (Darolia et al. 2015; Deming et al. 2016; Deterding and Pedulla 
2016). By contrast, those interested in macro-level processes that govern how much value 
the labor market confers on for-profit credentials have tended toward the use of large-







2014; Deming et al. 2012, 2013; Denice 2015; Gilpin, Saunders, and Stoddard 2015; 
Harding et al. 2010; Lang and Weinstein 2012; Liu and Belfield 2014).  
Results from audit studies assessing the value that employers bestow upon for-
profit credentials have been consistent – showing that employers at best view for-profit 
credentials no more favorably than credentials from non-profit institutions (Darolia et al. 
2015; Deterding and Pedulla 2016). Moreover, findings suggest that in some instances, 
employers may view for-profit post-secondary credentials no more favorably than they 
view prospective job candidates with just high school diplomas (Darolia et al. 2015; 
Deterding and Pedulla 2016). Deming et al. (2016) suggest that for-profit credentials may 
be a liability to job seekers in the labor market, finding that candidates with for-profit 
credentials are less likely to receive callbacks than their peers with credentials from non-
selective, public (non-profit) institutions. These findings have been consistent with the 
hypothesis that for-profit credentials act as a liability in the eyes of employers and other 
economic arbiters. The mechanisms behind these outcomes are unclear; perhaps for-
profit schools do not convey their “social charters” to employers in the way that similarly 
situated schools do to mitigate the effects of their “low-status” (Deil-Amen and 
Rosenbaum 2004; Meyer 1977).  
Others interested in the impact of college type on labor market outcomes have 
relied on secondary data. Extant literature on the labor market returns to for-profit sub-
baccalaureate credentials is somewhat consistent. Research suggests that labor market 
entrants with credentials from certificate programs, regardless of college type, do not 
experience an earnings gain relative to their peers with no formal education beyond high 







associate’s degrees experience an earnings penalty relative to their peers with public or 
private non-profit credentials (Denice 2015; Lang and Weinstein 2012). Some research 
on the earnings of for-profit associate’s degree holders opts to compare their outcomes 
with those of students who do not enroll in any post-secondary education at all after high 
school. This work concludes, perhaps unsurprisingly, that students with for-profit 
associate’s degrees earn more than employees with just a high-school diploma (Cellini 
and Chaudhary 2014). One might logically conclude from this work that any degree post-
high school will yield an earnings benefit, but that does not account for the debt burden 
incurred by students in for-profit associate’s degree programs. A more appropriate 
comparison group here may be students who earn their associate’s degrees from public 
institutions, which charge much lower tuition. Moreover, some work suggests that 
increases in enrollment and degree completion among for-profit two-year institutions 
mirror changes in labor market growth and wage increases in related occupations; these 
researchers posit that for-profit sub-baccalaureate institutions are more responsive to 
changes in the labor market than public community colleges (Gilpin et al. 2015). 
The literature on outcomes of bachelor’s degree holders is less clear. Some 
scholars find that for-profit bachelor’s degree holders earn less than their peers with non-
profit credentials9 (Deming et al. 2012), while others find no significant difference 
(Denice 2015). Some suggest that community college students who transfer to and 
graduate from for-profit colleges experience an earnings penalty relative to their peers 
 
9 Deming, Goldin, and Katz (2012) point out that some of the earnings differentials can be attributed to 
lower rates of employment among for-profit students. Nonetheless, they conclude that first-time 
postsecondary students wind up with…lower earnings six years after starting college [compared to] 







who transfer from community colleges to public or private non-profit institutions (Liu 
and Belfield 2014). Extant work also finds that for-profit students are more likely to be 
unemployed and to experience significant10 bouts of unemployment after they earn their 
degrees.  
Extant literature on the relationship between college type and labor market 
outcomes has largely overlooked the influence that race and ethnicity have on earnings 
and labor market outcomes. Studies mostly include race and ethnicity as mere control 
variables to help explain away some of the variation in labor market outcomes, without 
close attention to how these factors may contribute to that heterogeneity. To be sure, most 
frequently used education datasets include small samples of for-profit students, which 
makes stratifying them further by ethno-racial group more challenging in terms of 
statistical power. Nonetheless, given that a significant proportion of the students 
attending for-profit institutions are members of racial/ethnic minority groups (Cottom 
2017; Deming et al. 2012, 2013; Holland and DeLuca 2016; Iloh and Toldson 2013; 
Kinser 2006; Pusser and Turner 2006; Tierney and Hentschke 2007), work that pays 
explicit attention to labor market outcomes for students of color deserves more attention 
in the growing corpus of literature on these institutions. More work on this relationship 
would give us a better understanding of the major education-to-work pathways for key 
underrepresented groups in the U.S. 
For-Profit Colleges, Financial Aid, and Student Debt 
 
10 Deming, Goldin, and Katz (2012) define a significant period of unemployment as one that lasts for three 







To get a holistic picture of the outcomes that for-profit students encounter in the 
labor market, it is important to understand the business model upon which these 
institutions are predicated. Unlike their public and private non-profit counterparts who 
rely on more varied sources of revenue (Tierney and Hentschke 2007), for-profit 
institutions rely almost exclusively on the revenue generated from their students' federal 
and private student aid. A very high proportion of for-profit students are recipients of 
federal financial aid under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965; federal money 
also makes up a substantial percentage of for-profit institutions' total revenue. An 
industry-wide average of 75% of total revenue comes from federal aid programs, and the 
percentage at some large for-profit schools (e.g., University of Phoenix) is closer to 90% 
(Deming et al. 2013). By contrast, in 2001, tuition and fees comprised 28% of total 
revenues at non-profit public and private institutions (Tierney and Hentschke 2007). 
 Moreover, in what has become colloquially known as the 90/10 rule, section 
487(d)(4) of the amended Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) prohibits for-profit 
institutions from generating more than 90 percent of their revenue from federal Title IV 
student aid funds.11 For-profit institutions also enroll a significant number of veterans 
who are eligible under the G.I. Bill12 for tuition benefits; for-profits received 35.6% of 
education benefits paid under the Post-9/11 GI Bill of 2008. Moreover, G.I. Bill 
education benefits and tuition remissions are not considered federal Title IV student aid 
and, therefore, do not count toward the 90% cap imposed upon for-profits by the 
 
11 Higher Education Act of 1965, 89th U.S. Cong., Pub. L. No. 89-329 (1965) (amended). 
12 The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 and the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 
2008, 2010, and 2014 provide financial benefits in the form of tuition funding toward post-secondary 







Department of Education (Deming et al. 2012). This reliance on federal student aid and 
veterans' benefits, combined with the fact that for-profit institutions charge higher tuition, 
on average than their public and private non-profit counterparts (Deming et al. 2012, 
2013; Harding et al. 2010) leads to a situation in which students who graduate from for-
profit schools have a higher average student debt burden, and a higher loan default rate 
than their peers with non-profit degrees  (Baum 2011; Belfield 2013; Cellini and Darolia 
2017; Cottom 2017; Deming et al. 2012, 2013; Harding et al. 2010). Indeed, higher 
average student-debt burden coupled with poor educational/labor market outcomes along 
with a purported positive relationship between federal subsidies and tuition at for-profits 
(Cellini and Goldin 2014) has led some scholars to argue for the reduction of federal 
student aid funds directed to for-profits (Cellini and Koedel 2017). 
In evaluating the impact of college type on post-graduation earnings, extant 
literature has paid little attention to the impact that student debt burden has on these 
earnings. Similarly, the literature overlooks the impact that debt burden has on 
discretionary or disposable income, and how this varies across college type. Most 
scholars have chosen to focus instead on the effects of college type on gross earnings, as 
data on net earnings and incremental student debt burden is more difficult to come by 
(Cellini and Chaudhary 2014; Denice 2015; Lang and Weinstein 2012; Liu and Belfield 
2014). Discretionary income plays an essential role in the daily lives of many Americans. 
One could argue that it plays an even more important role than do gross earnings, 
especially in the daily lives of those of working-class, low-income, and/or racial/ethnic 
minority backgrounds, all of whom are overrepresented at for-profit institutions (Cottom 







suggests that there are significant gaps in rates of borrowing across college type, with for-
profit students borrowing significantly more than their non-profit peers, especially at two-
year schools; this work also shows that for-profit students have higher repayment rates 
than their non-profit peers (Belfield 2013; Cellini and Darolia 2017). Gaining a better 
understanding of how college type influences earnings, after accounting for student debt 
burden, will allow a clearer picture of the tangible, immediate impact that college-type 
has on labor market outcomes.  
Also missing from the literature on the relationship between college-type and 
labor market outcomes is the impact of that college-type has on employment instability 
(i.e., job tenure) and underemployment. Some work suggests that job seekers with for-
profit credentials are more likely to experience prolonged periods of unemployment, but 
the literature has not further explored this issue (Deming et al. 2012, 2013). Moreover, 
work on post-credential employment instability has not explicitly focused on job seekers 
who have received four-year bachelor’s degrees from for-profit institutions (Deming et 
al. 2012, 2013). 
Extant literature that has investigated the college type-related heterogeneity on 
labor market outcomes has almost always operationalized those outcomes as some 
measure of gross earnings, whether annual or incremental (Cellini and Chaudhary 2014; 
Cellini and Turner 2018; Deming et al. 2012, 2013; Denice 2015; Lang and Weinstein 
2012; Liu and Belfield 2014), but has not factored in any measures of student debt. 
Discretionary income (i.e., subtracting student debt from gross income) would be a more 
appropriate measure to shed more light on the relationship between college type and 








To address these gaps in extant research, this project will seek to answer the 
following questions: 
1. How does college type affect labor market outcomes among bachelor’s degree 
holders? 
2. How does race/ethnicity affect the relationship between college type and earnings 
among bachelor’s degree holders? 
DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS 
Data and Measures. 
Data. I used restricted data from the 2008-2012 Baccalaureate & Beyond (B&B) 
Longitudinal Study (B&B:08/12), a nationally representative longitudinal survey of new 
bachelor’s degree recipients who received their degrees during the 2007-2008 academic 
year and were followed up on in 2009 and again in 2012. B&B is administered and 
maintained by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) at the Institute for 
Education Sciences (IES), U.S. Department of Education (USDOE), and drew its 
participants from the 2007-08 National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS:08), 
also administered by the USDOE. In addition to records drawn from student interviews 
and associated inquiries, data collection for B&B:08/12 included matched data from the 
Central Processing System (CPS), the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS), and 
the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC). These sources provided data on federal 
financial aid (loans and grants), academic and assessment records, and post-baccalaureate 
enrollment (Cominole et al. 2015). B&B:08/12 can be used to assess bachelor’s degree 







repayment, enrollment in and persistence through post-baccalaureate education, and work 
experiences, especially for BA holders who become PK-12 teachers13 (Cominole et al. 
2015). 
The B&B:08/12 sampling frame was comprised of students who received their 
bachelor's degrees between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2008, at any Title IV college or 
university in the U.S. (including Puerto Rico). B&B:08/12 used a multistage sampling 
process, first sampling institutions from the NPSAS:08, next sampling students from 
those institutions, and finally verifying, via the NPSAS:08 interview, that students who 
were expected to complete their bachelor's degrees in the 2007-08 academic year actually 
did(Cominole et al. 2015). This process resulted in about 17,000 students14 who were 
included in the B&B:08/12, 85% of whom completed an interview (Cominole et al. 
2015). A responsive design was used to reduce nonresponse bias in the survey estimates 
by trying to increase response among respondents that were most likely not to respond 
(Cominole et al. 2015; Groves and Heeringa 2006). These data, with the appropriate 
adjustments15, are meant to be representative of the approximately 1.6 million American 
college students who received bachelor’s degrees during the sampling period. Analysis 
weights were used when calculating point estimates; these weights also adjust for non-
response. 
 
13 The B&B:08/12 participant interviews included a battery of questions specifically for PK-12 teachers and 
designed to survey their experiences working as educators. 
14 National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) restricted data use agreements disallow the reporting of 
exact sample sizes; all sample sizes reported here are necessarily approximations. 







Measures. My response variables were 1) the natural logarithm of annual 
income16, 2) borrowers’ debt to income ratio (operationalized as monthly debt payment to 
monthly income for borrowers who had entered repayment by 200917), 3) whether or not 
participants had switched jobs at least once by 200918, and 4) the employment status of 
participants in 2009 (i.e., whether someone was working one part-time (PT), one full-
time (FT), multiple jobs, or not working and/or enrolled in school). My predictor of 
interest was college type (i.e., non-profit/for-profit), operationalized as the sector (i.e., 
profit status) of respondents’ bachelor’s degree-granting institution. I also include a range 
of covariates aimed at addressing heterogeneity related to demographic and household 
characteristics, college characteristics, academic performance/aptitude, employment, and 
occupational characteristics, and regional characteristics. See Table 3.1 and Appendices 
3.A and 3.B for population-weighted summary statistics on outcomes and covariates.  
Covariates meant to control for demographic and household-related heterogeneity 
were respondents’ age19, gender, race/ethnicity, past or present military service, parental 
home ownership, maternal college-going, whether or not they had children, marital 
status, and parents’ yearly income20. Variance related to college characteristics and 
achievement was controlled for with predictors measuring participants’ age when they 
 
16 Annual income was transformed by taking its natural logarithm to aid interpretation; exponentiated 
regression coefficients can be interpreted in terms of percentage changes in annual income (parameters in 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 can be interpreted in this way).  
17 Borrowers who had not entered repayment by 2009 were dropped from the sample because they were 
coded in B&B:08/12 as having a debt to income ratio of zero. Monthly debt payments greater than 200% of 
the borrower's monthly income were re-coded at 200% by B&B:08/12. 
18 Models using this variable as the DV included only individuals who were working one full-time (FT) job 
as of 2009. 
19 I also initially included a squared term for age in earlier iterations of the models, but it was not 
significant – suggesting that a linear basis expansion on age was not necessary. Consequently, the squared 
term for age was omitted from the models shown here.  
20 The variable measured parents’ annual income in 2008 for dependents, and respondents’ annual income 







began and completed college, the percentage deviation in years from college entry to 
college completion (measured as the percentage deviation from the standard four-year 
completion time)21. Moreover, college selectivity, participants’ participation in federal 
TRIO programs (a proxy for low income, first-generation college student status), whether 
a respondent transferred colleges before receiving their bachelor's degree, and if so, the 
number of times that they transferred were controlled for. Covariates measuring academic 
achievement, such as high school22 and college grade point average, as well as SAT score 
(1600 scale), were also included. College major was also controlled for (see Appendix 
3.A for population-weighted summary statistics and greater detail about major 
groupings). In addition, summary statistics by ethno-racial group are displayed in Table 
3.2. Median and mean income for all ethno-racial groups are higher among for-profit 
bachelor’s degree holders than their peers with degrees from non-profit schools.  
Regional controls were employed to adjust for region-related variance in 
outcomes. These controls included whether a respondent lived in a metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA), as well as which region of the US respondents lived in. 
Employment and occupation-related heterogeneity were captured by measures of the 
percent of time respondents spent unemployed since earning their bachelor's degree, the 
number of hours worked per week, and the number of jobs that respondents held since 
earning their bachelor's degree. In addition, current occupation type (e.g., Healthcare, 
 
21 Given by !(("!#$!)#&)& 	# 100	, where &' is age at college completion for individual ' , (' is age at college 
entry for individual ', and ) is the constant four (e.g., four years is assumed to be the standard time to 
degree). Negative values (i.e., respondents that took less than four years to get their bachelor’s degree) 
were re-coded to 0% (i.e., four years). 
22 Unlike some other NCES datasets (e.g., Kirui and Kao 2018), a continuous measure of high school grade 







Education, Sales, etc.) was controlled for (see Appendix 3.B for population-weighted 
summary statistics and occupation type groupings). 
Model Specification. 
Listwise deletion was used to treat missing data on all variables for all models on 
pooled data. When data were disaggregated by racial groups, multiple imputation was 
used instead of listwise deletion.23 This was done to address concerns about statistical 
power due to small within-group sample sizes for some ethno-racial groups. To account 
for the multistage, non-random sample design, bootstrap replicate weights were used to 
compute bootstrap variance estimates that adjust for the non-stochastic nature of the 
sample design. Analysis weights, which adjust for nonresponse bias, were also used. Data 
from the 2007-08 National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS:08) and the 2009 
wave of B&B:08/12 were used for my analysis.  
After treating missing data and applying the appropriate bootstrap replicate and 
analysis weights, I estimated a series of nested models, each with one of four predictors: 
1) the natural logarithm of annual income on a pooled sample (Models 1.1 through 1.5, 
and 2.1 through 2.5) and stratified by ethno-racial group (Table 3.5), 2) monthly debt to 
monthly income ratio (Models 3.1 through 3.5), 3) likelihood of switching jobs by 2009 
(Models 4.1 through 4.5), and 4) employment type (Model 5). Nested models (denoted .1 
through .5) were nested in the same order for each of the least-squares and binomial logit 
models. College type was the sole predictor in “.1” models. Demographic and household 
characteristics (e.g., age, parental income and homeownership, gender, race/ethnicity, 
 







maternal college-going, marital status, and whether respondents had children) were added 
in “.2” models.  
College characteristics & cognitive measures (e.g., Age (at college entry and 
completion), % deviation from college entry to completion, SAT score (1600 scale), high 
school and college grade point average, college transfer, college selectivity, TRIO 
eligibility, and aggregated college major (see Appendix 3.A) were added in “.3” models. 
Regional controls were included in “.4” models (e.g., whether respondents lived in a 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA)), and their residence in one of four aggregated 
regions of the US (see Table 3.1)24. Lastly, measures of employment and occupation were 
added in “.5” models (e.g., % of time spent unemployed since earning a bachelor’s 
degree, hours worked per week, number of jobs held since earning a bachelor’s degree, 
number of jobs currently held, and aggregated occupation type). Details on aggregated 
occupation type measures can be found in Appendix 3.B.  
To aid in interpretation and due to space constraints, nested models were not used 
for Model 5. Instead, all covariates were included in a single model. Coefficients for 
certain variables are not included in results tables (Tables 3.3 through 3.8) also due to 
space constraints. Instead, a “Yes” or “No” is included to indicate whether or not they are 
controlled for in a particular model. Models 1.1 through 1.5 (Table 3.3) and 3.1 through 
3.5 (Table 3.6) exclude respondents who transferred institutions before earning their 
 
24 Regions were aggregated as follows: 1) Northeast includes CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT, DE, DC, MD, NJ, 
NY, & PA; 2) Midwest includes IL, IN, MI, OH, WI, IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, & SD; 3) South includes 
AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MI, NC, SC, TN, VA, & WV; 4) West includes CO, ID, MT, UT, WY, AZ, 
NM, OK, TX, AK, CA, HI, NV, OR, & WA. These regional classifications are consistent with previous 







bachelor’s degrees.25 Models 1.1 through 1.5 and 2.1 through 2.5 (Tables 3.3 and 3.4) 
include respondents who are working multiple jobs (number of jobs currently held is 
controlled for).26 Models 4.1 through 4.5 (Table 3.7) exclude respondents who did not 
work a single, full-time job in 2009. The sample was restricted to mitigate potential bias 
related to the outcomes. 
RESULTS 
In total, I estimated four sets of five nested models (three least squares and one 
binary logit), one set of OLS models disaggregated by ethno-racial group, and one 
multinomial logit model with a full array of predictors. The results of these models are 
displayed in Tables 3.3 through 3.8. Since the response variable in Models 1.1 through 
1.5, 2.1 through 2.5, and the models disaggregated by ethno-racial group (Tables 3.3 
through 3.5) was in log units (i.e., log income), coefficients were exponentiated to aid 
interpretation. Exponentiated coefficients are displayed in the results for Models 4.1 
through 4.5 and 5 (Tables 3.7 and 3.8). Only differences that have reached at least 
statistical significance at p < .10 are reported here. About 4.3% of the unrestricted sample 
(approx. 600 respondents) earned their bachelor’s degrees from for-profit schools. 
Results were disaggregated by ethno-racial group only for models where the outcome 
was annual earnings; this was because convergence failures prevented other models 
disaggregated by ethno-racial group from being estimated. 
 
25 This was done because there is no variable in B&B:08/12 that identifies whether a respondent transferred 
between college types (e.g., from for-profit to non-profit, etc.). This was also done to isolate the effect of 
attending a for-profit institution throughout respondents’ undergraduate years vs. having a bachelor’s 
degree from a for-profit institution. 
26 Models that constrained the sample to only those working a single job were also run, but they are not 
displayed here. Models that did not restrict the sample in this way were shown to have higher predictive 







The adjusted effect of college type on annual earnings. 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 display the results of Models 1.1 through 1.5 and 2.1 through 
2.5, respectively. These models estimated the effect of college type on the natural 
logarithm of annual income, controlling for a host of demographic, educational, regional, 
and employment characteristics. Exponentiated coefficients, which are displayed in 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4, can be interpreted in terms of percentage changes27 in annual income 
for a given predictor, after adjusting for the effects of all other predictors. To reduce 
transfer-related noise, respondents who transferred between any two (or more) 
institutions before receiving their bachelor’s degree were included in the sample in 
Models 1.1 through 1.5 but excluded from the sample before estimating Models 2.1 
through 2.5. B&B:08/12 does not have any variables available that specifically indicate 
whether a respondent has transferred between college types (non-profit to for-profit or 
vice versa), so excluding transfers is an imperfect way of reducing heterogeneity related 
to transfer between college types.28  
Models 1.1 through 1.5, displayed in Table 3.3, include transfer students in the 
sample from which the estimates are generated. Model 1.1 suggests a moderately 
significant (p < .10) positive effect of holding a for-profit bachelor’s degree on earnings. 
Model 1.1 indicates that employees with for-profit bachelor's degrees earn roughly 22% 
more than their peers with non-profit degrees; however, this model's only predictor is 
college type and it has little predictive power (Adj. R2 = .0018). The effect of holding a 
for-profit bachelor's degree remains positive but statistically insignificant in Models 1.2 
 
27 Percent deviation given by: *+,-( − 1/	,	100 
28 This is a flawed method to be sure; excluding all transfers excludes transfers who did not transfer across 







through 1.4, suggesting that demographic, household, college, and regional effects 
explain away the statistically significant positive effect found in Model 1.1. In Model 1.5, 
which adds employment/occupational controls, the positive and moderately significant 
effect of holding a for-profit bachelor's degree on annual earnings returns. Model 1.5 
suggests that employees with for-profit degrees have annual earnings that are about 13% 
higher than their peers with degrees from non-profit schools.   
The full set of covariates in Model 1.5 explains nearly half of the variance in 
respondents' annual income (Adj. R2 = .4846). The addition of employment and 
occupation-related controls in Model 1.5 explain almost 30% of the variance in 
respondents' annual earnings (.4846 [Adj. R2 (M1e)] - .1855 [Adj. R2 (M1d)] = 0.2991); 
given that the outcome is earnings, this is not all that surprising. Moreover, college 
characteristics and cognitive measures appear to explain about 11% of the variance in 
annual income (.1795 [Adj. R2 (M1.3)] - .0701 [Adj. R2 (M1.2]) = .1094). These models 
suggest that employees with for-profit bachelor’s degrees earn more than their peers with 
degrees from non-profit schools. This finding is notable because it is counter to much of 
the existing literature (Deming et al. 2012; Denice 2015). 
However, when transfers are excluded from the sample, a different story begins to 
emerge. Models 2.1 through 2.5 (Table 3.4) display nested model estimates that excluded 
students with one or more transfers from the sample. The models show a consistent 
pattern; employees with for-profit bachelor’s degrees do not earn more than their peers 
with non-profit degrees. The models suggest a negative effect of holding a for-profit 
bachelor’s degree on income (although it’s important to note that it’s not significantly 







for-profit bachelor’s degrees do not significantly differ from those of their peers with 
non-profit bachelor’s degrees. Models 2.2 through 2.5 also have more predictive power 
than their Model 1 counterparts. The covariates in Model 2.5 jointly explain over half of 
the variance in respondents’ annual income (Adj R2 = .5216), compared to about 48% of 
the variance in Model 1.5 (Adj R2 = .4846). Excluding transfer students from the sample 
appears to give the models more predictive power. Like in the first set of models (Models 
1.1 through 1.5), occupation and employment-related controls explain around 30% of the 
variance in annual income (.5216 [Adj. R2 (M2.5)] - .1974 [Adj. R2 (M2.4)] = 0.3242)). 
Similar to the first set of models, college characteristics and cognitive measures jointly 
appear to explain around 10% of the variance in annual earnings (.1884 [Adj. R2 (M2.3)] 
- .0929 [Adj. R2 (M2.2]) = .0955). I also ran ancillary models29 which produced 
estimates based on a restricted sample of only those respondents who held one full-time 
job. These models showed a similar pattern to the models described earlier; the models 
that include transfers show a significant positive effect while those that excluded them 
did not. I do not display the results from these models here because they both had lower 
predictive power than the models displayed in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 (Adj. R2 = .3200 and 
.3914, respectively).  
Ethno-racial heterogeneity in the effect of college type on annual earnings. 
Table 3.5 displays the adjusted effects of college type on annual earnings, 
disaggregated by ethno-racial group. Among Whites and Latinos, the effect of holding a 
for-profit bachelor’s degree on earnings is insignificant. However, among Blacks and 
Asians, this effect is significant and negative. Among Blacks, the model suggests that 
 







those who hold for-profit bachelor’s degrees earn about 38% less than their peers with 
non-profit bachelor’s degrees. For Asians, this negative effect is both highly significant 
(p < .001) and the largest in magnitude. Among Asians, the model suggests that those 
who hold for-profit bachelor’s degrees earn about 57% less than their peers who hold 
non-profit bachelor’s degrees. For Whites, the full array of covariates jointly explain 
about 47% (Adj. R2 = .4705) of the variance in earnings. For Latinos, they explain about 
46% (Adj. R2 = .4611), for Blacks about 58% (Adj. R2 = .57766), and for Asians about 
57% (Adj. R2 = .5742). Figure 3.1 displays the exponentiated coefficients highlighting 
ethno-racial differences in predicted income among for-profit bachelor’s degree holders. 
Displayed in Table 3.2 is the sample median income among each ethno-racial group; 
across the board, median income is higher among those with for-profit degrees than their 
same-race peers with non-profit degrees. Figure 3.1 highlights the ethno-racial 
differences in predicted income among for-profit bachelor’s degree holders. Within each 
ethno-racial group, plotted exponentiated coefficients are compared to non-profit 
bachelor’s degree holders. 
The adjusted effect of college type on monthly debt to monthly income ratio.  
Table 3.6 displays the results of Models 3.1 through 3.5. These models estimated 
the effect of college type on monthly debt to monthly income ratio, controlling for a host 
of demographic, educational, regional, and employment characteristics as in Models 1.1 
through 1.5 and 2.1 through 2.5. This response variable was calculated by taking a 
respondent’s monthly loan payment as a percentage of their monthly income. 
Respondents who met any of the following criteria were excluded from the sample: 1) did 







not entered repayment on their loans as of 2009, or 4) did not earn income in 2009. The 
sample was further restricted to only those respondents who worked one full-time job in 
2009, and those who did not transfer institutions before earning their bachelor’s degree.   
Model 3.1, the base model, estimates a positive but statistically insignificant 
effect of college type on debt to income ratio; from this, we can infer that although the 
effect is positive, it is not estimated to be significantly different from zero. Moreover, this 
model explains less than 1% of the variance in graduates’ debt to income ratio (Adj. R2 = 
.003). With the addition of covariates measuring family background and demographic 
traits in Model 3.2, a moderately significant positive effect of college type on debt to 
income ratio develops; this suggests that, on average, employees holding for-profit 
bachelor’s degrees a higher debt to income ratio than their peers with non-profit 
bachelor’s degrees (effect size: 5.340). When adjusting for college characteristics and 
cognitive measures, the significance of this effect disappears. Moreover, Model 3.2 
suggests that around 19% of the variance in debt to income ratio can be jointly explained 
by college characteristics and cognitive measures (.2392 [Adj. R2 (M3.3)] - .0499 [Adj. 
R2 (M3.2)] = 0.1893)).  
When adjusting for regional variation in Model 3.4, the effect of college type on 
debt to income ratio remains insignificant. When controlling for the full gamut of 
covariates in Model 3.5, including employment and occupation-related variance, the 
statistically significant positive effect for college type reemerges (effect size: 4.657). This 
suggests, again, that employed graduates with for-profit bachelor’s degrees have a higher 
average debt to income ratio than their peers with non-profit bachelor’s degrees. The 







debt to income ratio (Adj R2 = .3572). Moreover, employment and occupation-related 
measures jointly explain about 11% of the variance in graduates’ debt to income ratios 
(.3572 [Adj. R2 (M3.5)] - .2476 [Adj. R2 (M3.4)] = 0.1096)).  
The adjusted effect of college type on the likelihood of switching jobs and the 
likelihood of holding different types of employment. 
Table 3.7 displays the odds ratio results of Models 4.1 through 4.5, which 
estimate the effect of college type on the likelihood of graduates switching jobs at least 
once within two years after they received their bachelor’s degrees, controlling for 
demographic/household, college characteristics and cognitive measures, and regional, 
occupation, and employment-related heterogeneity. For these models, the sample was 
restricted to only those respondents who had one full-time job in 2009. The base model, 
Model 4.1, estimated just the effect of college type on the likelihood of switching jobs; 
Model 4.1 shows a positive but insignificant impact of holding a for-profit bachelor's 
degree on changing jobs. Model 4.2, which controls for demographic and household 
characteristics, in addition to college type, also shows a positive but insignificant effect 
of holding a for-profit bachelor's degree on switching jobs. 
College characteristics and cognitive measures are added to the controls in Model 
4.3. With the addition of these covariates, the magnitude of the effect of college type 
increases substantially (OR: 1.138 (though not significantly different from 1) in Model 
4.2; OR: 4.032 in Model 4.3) and becomes statistically significant. Model 4.3 suggests 
that employees with bachelor's degrees from for-profit schools are three times more 
likely [(4.032-1) x 100 = 303.2%] to switch jobs at least once within two years of 







and 4.5 show similar results, with the magnitude of the effects increasing with the 
addition of more predictors and the statistical significance of the effects remaining. In 
Model 4.4, employees with for-profit bachelor's degrees are predicted to be almost 3.2 
times more likely [(4.156-1) x 100 = 303.2%] to switch jobs than their peers with non-
profit pedigrees. In Model 4.5, graduates holding for-profit bachelor's degrees are 
predicted to be nearly four times [(4.896-1) x 100 = 389.6%] more likely to switch jobs 
than their non-profit peers. The Archer-Lemeshow test is an adapted version of the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test, which estimates the goodness of fit for complex survey designs 
(Archer, Lemeshow, and Hosmer 2007). Figure 3.2 displays the predicted probability of 
switching jobs at least once within two years after graduation by college type; the 
predicted probabilities shown in Figure 3.2 were derived from Model 4.5. 
Table 3.8 displays the odds ratio results of Model 5, which relies on a multinomial 
logit model to estimate the likelihood of holding different types (e.g., part-time, full-time, 
etc.) of employment a year after graduation. Although the outcome is ordinal, I opted for 
a multinomial logit model over an ordered logit model because the data violated the 
proportional odds assumption imposed by the latter model (%% = 	53429.31	(88); 	2 <
	.000).30 After controlling for demographic/household, college and cognitive, regional, 
and employment/occupation-related heterogeneity. Model 5 shows a positive, statistically 
significant effect for college type on holding a part-time job instead of a full-time job 
(OR: 2.722). Moreover, these results suggest that a graduate with a for-profit bachelor’s 
degree is 1.7 times more likely [(2.722-1) x 100 = 172.2%] to hold a part-time job instead 
of a full-time job than their peers who hold non-profit bachelor’s degrees. Figure 3 
 







displays the adjusted odds ratios highlighting the likelihood of holding different types of 
employment among for-profit bachelor’s degree holders. 
Although I attempted to examine ethno-racial heterogeneity in the effect of 
college type on debt-to-income ratio, and employment type and instability, modeling 
these outcomes was not possible due to convergence failures. Future research should 
evaluate the degree to which ethno-racial heterogeneity manifests in the relationship 
between college type and these outcomes.  
Robustness Checks. 
 Propensity Score Covariate Adjustment. I relied on propensity score methods to 
test the robustness of my results. When disaggregating the sample by ethno-racial groups, 
the resulting subsamples were too small to allow for the formation of adequate matches in 
all ethno-racial subgroups except Whites. Moreover, because the subsamples were 
already small, additional attrition resulting from unmatched pairs would have been 
particularly unsavory. I, therefore, chose to forgo full matching and instead employ the 
small sample propensity score methods recommended by Guo and Fraser (2009), Holmes 
(2013), and Holmes and Olsen (2010). Holmes and Olsen (2010) suggest that rather than 
losing additional cases due to unmatched propensity scores, in small samples, when 
attrition is particularly undesirable, the propensity score can be computed and then 
included in the analysis model as a covariate.   
 Covariate balance was evaluated using a method set forth by Holmes and Olsen 
(2010) and Guo and Fraser (2009) for assessing balance with small sample propensity 
score methods. Covariate balance is displayed in Appendix 3.C. Balance was evaluated 







models, using computed propensity score weights. In the pooled sample, balance was 
achieved on all but five covariates: Age, Parental Income, Marital Status, Age at College 
Completion, the deviation from College Entry to Completion. Balance was also assessed 
within each ethno-racial stratum (NH Whites, NH Blacks, Latinos, & Asians) and largely 
mirrored the covariate balance in the pooled sample. However, balance was not achieved 
on the following covariates - for NH Blacks: Marital Status; for Latinos: Lives in MSA, 
Northeast, and West; and for Asians: Marital Status, SAT Score, Lives in Midwest, and 
Military Service. 
 Appendix 3.D displays the propensity score-adjusted earnings results in the 
pooled sample, and each ethno-racial stratum. The propensity score covariate adjustment 
method does not substantively change the earnings results. In the combined sample, the 
effect of holding a for-profit bachelor's degree on annual earnings remains insignificant. 
Among Blacks and Asians, the significant and adverse effects of holding a for-profit 
bachelor's degree remain intact, with only slight fluctuations in magnitude and, for 
Asians, significance. This suggests that the impact of holding for-profit bachelor's 
degrees persist even after non-random selection is accounted for. Though the effect of 
college type on the debt-to-income ratio in Model 3.5 is only significant at the a < .10 
level, when accounting for selection through propensity score adjustment, this effect 
becomes significant at the a < .05 level. The positive statistically significant effect of 
college type on the likelihood of switching jobs remains intact after propensity score 
covariate adjustment (the significance level holds, and the magnitude decreases slightly 







time instead of a full-time job increases in magnitude and holds its significance after 
adjustment. 
 Measuring wages. Scholars who study the effect of college type on earnings 
sometimes operationalize earnings as hourly wages rather than annual income (Cellini 
and Chaudhary 2014; Denice 2015). B&B:08/12, however, does not include a raw 
measure of hourly wages. To remedy this, I generated a measure of hourly wages31 
derived from other available measures in the dataset. By doing this, I aimed to determine 
whether the results were influenced by these differences in the measurement of the 
outcome. I then ran a series of ancillary models32 which substituted that measure for 
annual income. Results of these models did not differ meaningfully33 from the results 
reported here, implying that in this context, measuring earnings as gross annual income 
rather than total hourly wages is largely inconsequential.  
Considering the Counterfactual. Interested parties thinking about the effects of 
for-profit attendance and degree-holding may wonder what the alternatives would be if 
students who attended for-profit colleges did not. Though I do not engage in a formal 
impact evaluation, the existing body of literature can help answer this question. My 
results are clear on how graduating from four-year BA granting non-profit schools effects 
outcomes, but there are other possible routes to a degree. Low SES students who 
otherwise would not have attended college may be more likely to complete a bachelor’s 
 
31 A measure of hourly wages was given by 
*&' )0 / ('1 , where &' is the value of gross annual income for 
individual ', (' is the number of hours worked per week for individual ', and ) is the constant fifty-two 
(e.g., fifty-two weeks in one year). 
32 Ancillary models available on request. 
33 In the models with hourly wages as the dependent variable, the coefficient for college-type (i.e., for-







degree (presumably from a non-profit 4-year college) if they attend community colleges 
(Brand, Pfeffer, and Goldrick-Rab 2014). Since most students at for-profit colleges are 
low SES (Cottom 2017; DeLuca et al. 2016; Deming et al. 2012, 2013), Brand et al. 
(2014)’s work suggests that they may have better outcomes by attending community 
colleges. Students who attend for-profit colleges may, alternatively, choose not to attend 
any college. However, research suggests that for-profit colleges compete mostly with 
community colleges for their students (Deming et al. 2012, 2013) and that if for-profit 
schools weren't an option, their students would likely attend community colleges instead 
(Chung 2012; DeLuca et al. 2016; Holland and DeLuca 2016; Iloh and Tierney 2014). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 In sum, I found that while in the aggregate for-profit bachelor’s degree holders’ 
annual incomes do not significantly differ from those of their peers with non-profit 
degrees, there is notable ethno-racial heterogeneity in this finding. Among Blacks and 
Asians, there is a robust earnings penalty among for-profit bachelor's degree holders 
relative to their peers. Asians, in particular, have the most substantial earnings penalty 
associated with holding a for-profit bachelor's degree. Among Whites and Latinos, 
however, there is no evidence of such a penalty.  
Among Blacks, extant work suggests a complex interaction between race and 
college type/quality on the job market. Evidence suggests that a double penalty exists 
even among black job seekers with elite “high status” bachelor’s degrees. The theory of a 
double penalty holds that even the effects of a "high status" (e.g., Ivy League, etc.) degree 
do not entirely counteract the importance of race in the labor market (Gaddis 2014). I 







and can help explain the earnings penalty among Black for-profit degree holders. If the 
effects of high-status degrees cannot fully counteract the importance of race on the job 
market, then it follows that the impact of low-status degrees would magnify these same 
effects. Moreover, this leads to a double jeopardy scenario where Black job seekers 
experience penalties stemming from both race and college-type.  
There are several explanations for the earnings penalty among Asian-American 
for-profit degree holders. Perhaps the most apparent explanation concerns SES 
differences among Asian-American groups (e.g., East Asian/Southeast Asian origin) that 
are obscured under a broad Asian-American category. Unfortunately, B&B:08/12 does 
not disaggregate the Asian-American category. Moreover, Table 3.2 suggests that in the 
sample, Asian-American for-profit graduates' median incomes are higher than their peers 
with non-profit degrees. In addition, SES is controlled for, and selection bias related to 
SES is minimized through propensity score covariate adjustment. Another explanation 
deals with how employers view the for-profit credentials of Asian-American job seekers. 
Fueled by the persistence of the model minority myth, employers may exact a penalty on 
Asian-American job seekers who, in their mind, do not conform to it (e.g., by having a 
“low-status” for-profit degree). This theory is in line with extant research suggesting that 
some educators and employers may hold Asian-American students and employees to 
higher standards (Lee 1994; Ng 2009). B&B:08/12 does not have the requisite data to test 
the veracity of these theories, but this is an area deserving of further study.  
  The lack of a for-profit earnings penalty in the pooled sample masks considerable 
heterogeneity by race and ethnicity. Other work that has found evidence of an earnings 







and attributed it to for-profit degree holders in the aggregate. My results suggest that the 
effect of a for-profit degree on earnings is not equal across racial or ethnic groups. Ethno-
racial heterogeneity was only observed when transfer students were excluded, but the 
estimates on which it is based jointed have higher predictive power in explaining 
variance in annual income. That said, when transfer students are included, the estimates 
suggest that overall, employees with for-profit bachelor’s degrees may earn slightly more 
than their non-profit peers. Given that this finding runs counter to much of the extant 
literature (Deming et al. 2012; Denice 2015), it seems more of a data artifact than a 
generalizable finding. Moreover, when transfer students are included, ethno-racial 
heterogeneity in the outcome is explained away. Although models including transfers 
have slightly less predictive power than models excluding them, transfer inclusive models 
still explain nearly half of the variance in annual income. Additional work is needed to 
explain the relationship between transfer and ethno-racial heterogeneity. Disparities in 
the results between transfer-exclusive and transfer-inclusive models suggest that there is 
some property of transfer students that contributes to these differences. My decision to 
exclude transfer students from some models was borne of a desire to differentiate the 
effect of attending a for-profit college from first postsecondary enrollment through to 
completion from that of merely holding a for-profit degree, regardless of the path that 
was taken to attain it. In theory, some students who graduated with for-profit degrees may 
have experience with non-profit higher education as well; I wanted to draw a distinction 
between these students and those for whom for-profit institutions have been their sole 







 The majority of work on the labor market outcomes of for-profit graduates has 
focused narrowly on their earnings (Cellini and Chaudhary 2014; Darolia et al. 2015; 
Deming et al. 2016, 2012; Denice 2015; Lang and Weinstein 2012). However, I argue 
that earnings do not paint a complete picture of the financial stability and well-being of 
these graduates. Instead, we should move toward more comprehensive metrics of their 
financial lives. Previous work has shown that students with for-profit credentials have 
higher average student debt burdens than their non-profit counterparts (Baum 2011; 
Belfield 2013; Cellini and Darolia 2017; Cottom 2017; Deming et al. 2012, 2013; 
Harding et al. 2010). However, little of this work has endeavored to investigate this in the 
context of earnings and the impact that it has on discretionary income. Discretionary 
month-to-month income plays a significant role in the lives of many Americans, 
particularly those of lower SES backgrounds like for-profit graduates.  
For-profit graduates who are working a single full-time job, in repayment on their 
student loans, and who stayed in a single institution throughout their college career are 
estimated to have a higher monthly debt to income ratio, even after controlling for their 
annual income. The models that these conclusions are based on have high predictive 
power; they predict more than one-third of the variance in debt to income ratios. This 
means that for-profit bachelor's degree graduates have, on average, less monthly 
discretionary income than their peers with non-profit bachelor's degrees. This means less 
money for monthly expenses such as rent, bills, childcare, and food. Though for-profit 
graduates' earnings equal those of their peers, a lower fraction of those earnings are 
available to them for expenses outside their student debt. This effect is likely 







those whose student debt is in deferral, forbearance, or default (and whose loans are 
likely accruing interest - further increasing their debt burdens). 
An important source of financial security is holding a stable job. However, for-
profit bachelor's degree holders are nearly four times more likely to experience 
employment instability after graduation than their non-profit peers even after adjusting 
for a host of covariates. That is, they are more likely to switch jobs multiple times within 
a short period. This form of employment instability introduces another form of 
uncertainty into the lives of graduates with for-profit bachelor's degrees. Another 
important component of financial stability is the type of job or jobs that a person holds. 
Unemployment and underemployment can both have consequences for financial stability. 
I have found that for-profit bachelor's degree holders are almost twice as likely to be 
underemployed (i.e., working one part-time job instead of one full-time job) than their 
peers with non-profit bachelor's degrees. Underemployment is a large factor in 
contributing to financial insecurity. To be sure, underemployment is a notable 
phenomenon among recent college graduates with non-profit degrees, but college type-
related variance was accounted for in the model. Still, there were marked, significant 
differences in the likelihood of different levels of employment intensity by college type. 
Underemployment is a broad concept that does not capture the varying underlying 
reasons that people are underemployed. Sometimes people choose part-time employment 
because they have competing constraints on their time (e.g., childcare or eldercare) or are 
otherwise unable to work full-time (e.g., disability); these constraints might be more 








2003). More work is needed here to separate those who are underemployed due to labor 
market constraints and those that elect to be for personal reasons. 
My results suggest that the impact of holding a for-profit degree on labor market 
outcomes is not stable across ethno-racial groups. At a time when the majority of 
bachelor’s degrees granted to Black students are from for-profit colleges (Cottom 2017), 
this finding has significant implications for racial stratification in the labor market. 
Although I was unable to investigate this heterogeneity beyond earnings, future work 
should test the degree to which ethno-racial disparities in earnings extend to other 
outcomes. Moreover, gross earnings do not paint a complete picture of labor market 
outcomes. In an era of rising student debt, I argue that research that focuses solely on 
post-graduate gross earnings as a measure of financial security misses the mark, 
particularly for for-profit graduates. Instead, we should rely on more comprehensive 
measures of employment to assess financial stability and security. This is particularly true 
for for-profit graduates, who hold, on average, more student debt (Baum 2011; Belfield 
2013; Cellini and Darolia 2017; Cottom 2017; Deming et al. 2012, 2013; Harding et al. 
2010) and may have more constrained employment choices due to outside factors (e.g., 
childcare, eldercare, other competing family responsibilities). Scholars must stop treating 
simple measures of gross income as wholly determinative of labor market inequality. 
Instead, we should rely on more comprehensive measures that more accurately capture 





CHAPTER 4: A WAY FORWARD 
  This dissertation has examined how for-profit colleges impact educational 
inequality, and social stratification interacts with points along the trajectories taken by 
many students as they enter and progress through college, and transition to the workforce. 
In chapter one, I found that the reasons that high-achieving students choose for-profit 
education are not entirely dissimilar from those cited by their more modestly achieving 
peers. Moreover, I found that a dearth of parents’ and students’ social capital may play a 
role in high achieving students choosing for-profit education. Perhaps just as important as 
the factors that “push” students toward for-profit education, are those that “pull” students 
in (Deil-Amen et al. 2019). Although I could not address these adequately with my data, I 
believe that going forward, an examination of the relationship between these "push" and 
"pull" factors is necessary. Understanding how these social forces work together to 
promote the choice of for-profit education will give scholars a more complete 
understanding of the college choice process among for-profit students.  In chapter one, I 
also suggested that the processes of status acquisition may not be as uniform as 
previously thought. More work that looks at how the relationship between status-group 
participation and academic achievement engenders status acquisition will be important in 
determining whether, as I argue, benefits gained from status-group participation are truly 
uneven. 
  In chapter two, I found that students who begin college at two-year for-profit 
institutions are less likely to successfully transfer to any four-year college and ultimately 
get their bachelor's degree. Further, even among students who expressed planning to 








two-year for-profit schools are less likely actually to follow through on their transfer 
plans. These findings call into question whether the transfer pathway functions at all for 
for-profit students. I argue that these observations are an instance of an institutional 
cooling out of the expectations of for-profit college students.  I observe that barriers to 
fluid transfer between institutions of higher education – particularly those pertaining to 
course credit transferability – can lead to cooling out of students' expectations. To be 
sure, I am not arguing in this chapter that for-profits are solely responsible for this 
cooling out effect. Indeed, I point to institutionalized barriers to transfer mobility that 
were not solely erected by for-profit schools. Just as important, however, I also point to 
the micro-level ways in which for-profit college surrogates may contribute to this cooling 
out effect. At a macro-level, I also point to how my findings complicate the relationship 
between status attainment and educational expansion. 
  In chapter three, I found that, in the aggregate, there was no evidence that for-
profit bachelor's degree holders earned less than their peers with bachelor's degrees from 
non-profit schools. However, when broken down by race, Black and Asian holders of for-
profit bachelor's degrees earned less than their same-race counterparts with non-profit 
credentials. Moreover, I found that graduates with for-profit bachelor's degrees had a 
higher average student debt-to-income ratio, were more likely to experience short-term 
employment instability, and were more likely to be underemployed. Although there needs 
to be much more work to say anything conclusive, I postulate that these employment 
outcomes may be evidence of that for-profit credentials may emit negative signals to 
employers. Moreover, regarding the intersection of race and for-profit colleges, I argue 








(2014) notion of the "double penalty" whereby the combined negative effects of race and 
type of college credential are magnified at the low end of the higher education status 
hierarchy. Similarly, I argue that employers may sanction what they view as non-
conformity to the model minority stereotype - exacting a penalty against Asian-American 
for-profit credential holders who they perceive as holdings “low-status” degrees. 
 In conclusion, I would like to return to the definition of a for-profit college that I 
laid out in the introduction to this dissertation. I defined for-profit colleges as institutions 
that are owned and operated by enterprises that return excess revenue to their 
shareholders or private owners in the form of profit. Throughout this dissertation, I have 
used this definition to refer, perhaps euphemistically, to a particular type of for-profit 
college. However, in actuality, defining an institution by its profit status is a complicated 
and messy endeavor. In the changing landscape of American higher education, my 
original definition no longer accurately represents the evolution of institutions of higher 
education that we are witnessing in the 21st century.  
  All institutions engage in revenue-generating activities; the distinguishing factor 
has conventionally concerned what an institution does with any revenue left over after it 
covers its operating costs. Moreover, institutions of higher education are increasingly 
blurring the lines between what has conventionally been considered "for-profit" and 
"non-profit." Over the last decade, colleges and universities with non-profit status have 
increased their presence in spaces once seen as the domain for for-profits – such as 
offering online courses (California Association of Private Postsecondary Schools 2017). 
There are also multiple instances of for-profit college operators explicitly changing their 








funding and/or avoid the negative stigma associated with status as a for-profit college 
(Halperin 2013). To add to the confusion, partnerships between non-profit colleges and 
for-profit education companies have been on the rise (e.g., Purdue University and Kaplan, 
Inc. creating Purdue University Global) (California Association of Private Postsecondary 
Schools 2017). For-profit education technology companies further complicate the 
definition, as they have created and vastly expanded Massive Open Online Courses 
(MOOCs) (e.g., Udacity, Coursera, edX, etc.). Moreover, many of the courses developed 
for these platforms are borne out of partnerships with non-profit colleges and universities. 
The concept of what constitutes a for-profit institution is not static, and the connotations 
that have typically been associated with for-profit institutions may not map neatly onto 
nascent educational mediums. As many non-profit colleges and universities continue to 
face myriad financial and budgetary issues, partnering with and/or emulating for-profit 
educational organizations to generate additional revenue will continue to be a tantalizing 
proposition for them. It remains to be seen how these changes in the higher education 
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Table 3.1: Population weighted summary statistics of dependent and independent 
variables, Wave 1, B&B 2008-12 Study Sample 
  Pct./Mean SE/SD 
For-Profit 4.286 0.381 
Annual Income ($) (M/SD) 36205.560 20476.690 
Debt-to-income Ratio☨ {M/SD) 9.806 13.160 
# jobs held now:   
Not working and/or enrolled 16.210 0.609 
1 Part-time  7.770 0.466 
1 Full-time 63.260 0.824 
Multiple 12.770 0.549 
Age (M/SD) 26.819 6.823 
Parents' Income ($) (M/SD) 74560.290 63925.160 
Female 57.680 0.875 
Race:   
Non-Hispanic White 81.550 0.691 
Non-Hispanic Black 8.420 0.501 
Asian/Asian-American 4.650 0.394 
American Indian/Alaska Native 0.950 0.183 
Multiracial 2.600 0.260 
Other race 1.810 0.210 
Hispanic/Latino (any race) 8.450 0.499 
Parents' Own Home 71.360 0.787 
Mother has 4 yrs. college 39.340 0.866 
Married 31.520 0.810 
Children 13.180 0.594 
Age at college entry (M/SD) 18.655 2.790 
Age at graduation (M/SD) 25.343 6.786 
Deviation from entry to grad. (M/SD) 70.323 145.426 
SAT Score (1600 scale) (M/SD) 1084.485 178.085 
HS GPA (M/SD) 3.307 0.703 
College GPA (M/SD) 3.262 0.481 
Selectivity:   
Open admission 8.570 0.652 
Minimally selective 9.810 0.526 
Moderately selective 54.580 0.876 
Very selective 27.040 0.786 








Table 3.1: Population weighted summary statistics of dependent and independent 
variables, Wave 1, B&B 2008-12 Study Sample 
  Pct./Mean SE/SD 
First Generation, Low Income 12.890 0.563 
# of transfers (M/SD) 0.812 0.942 
% of time unemployed since BA (M/SD) 5.767 10.931 
# hours worked/week (M/SD) 39.487 11.101 
# jobs held since BA (M/SD) 1.758 0.990 
Military service 3.560 0.330 
Lived in MSA 69.060 0.797 
Lived in the Northeast 22.030 0.721 
Lived in the Midwest 25.800 0.745 
Lived in the West 26.910 0.780 
Lived in the South 24.530 0.768 
Note: Values may not sum to 100 due to rounding; Values displayed are 
percentage/proportion estimates and standard errors unless marked Mean/SD. 
* Summary statistics for college field of study and occupation found in Appendices 
3.A and 3.B. 










Table 3.2 Population weighted summary statistics for annual income ($) by 
race/ethnicity, B&B 2008-2012 Study Sample 
    Non-Profit   For-Profit 
    Mean (SD) Median   Mean (SD) Median 
Non-Hispanic White  35,445.21 (20,232.82) 32,000 
 51,190.8 
(26,310.91) 41,132 
Non-Hispanic Black  35,017.2 (18,596.44) 32,000 
 47,136.57 
(17,559.15) 37,939.20 




Islander   
42,391.58 
(19,123.48) 37,220   
59,453.73 
(33,658.95) 45,000 
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Public Not-for-profit Private Not-for-profit Private For-profit
SOURCE: Author’s rendering of Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) data, 











Figure 2.1. Predicted Probability of Transfer to a Four-Year, Non-Profit College by Two-





Figure 2.2. Predicted Probability of Transfer to Any Four-Year College by Two-Year 












Figure 2.3. Predicted Probability of Transfer to Any Four-Year College Among Students 





Figure 3.1. Exponentiated Coefficients Highlighting Ethno-Racial Differences in 
Predicted Income Among For-Profit Bachelor’s Degree Holders 
 
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10 (two-tailed tests) 
Source: Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study, 2008-2012 
Note: exp. coefficients graphed on a logarithmic scale; 95% confidence bands displayed; 










Figure 3.2. Predicted Probability of Switching Jobs At Least Once Within Two Years 
After Graduation (i.e., “employment instability”) by College Type (Model 4.5) 
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10 (two-tailed tests) 
Source: Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study, 2008-2012 
Note: 95% confidence bands displayed 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Adjusted Odds Ratios Highlighting Likelihood of Holding Different Types of 
Employment Among For-Profit Degree Holders (Model 5).  
 
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10 (two-tailed tests) 
Source: Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study, 2008-2012 
Note: ORs graphed on a logarithmic scale; 95% confidence bands displayed; reference 
category: One Full-time (FT) job 
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Appendix 3.C. Covariate balance before and after propensity score weight adjustment, 
B&B 2008-2012 Study Sample, (Treatment = For-Profit) 
Predictor Variable   Unweighted p val. Weighted p val. 
Age  0.000 0.028 
Parents' Income in 2008  0.000 0.004 
Female  0.018 0.573 
Non-Hispanic White  0.000 0.481 
Non-Hispanic Black  0.000 0.294 
Hispanic/Latino  0.000 0.526 
Asian-American  0.316 0.139 
American Indian/Alaska Native  0.670 0.072 
Multiracial  0.520 0.124 
Other race  0.000 0.953 
Parents' Homeownership  0.000 0.088 
Marital status  0.000 0.044 
Children  0.000 0.11 
Age at College Entry   0.000 0.573 
Age at College Completion  0.000 0.01 
Deviation from col. entry to completion  0.000 0.001 
SAT Score  0.000 0.288 
High School GPA  0.000 0.051 
Lives in MSA  0.000 0.735 
Lives in Northeast  0.991 0.075 
Lives in Southeast  0.332 0.96 
Lives in Midwest  0.198 0.591 
Lives in West  0.014 0.382 
Military Service   0.000 0.446 
Note: Significance tests are based on one-way ANOVAs or log-linear analyses. Results 
are weighted using propensity score weights. Alternative method of assessing balance 
consistent with the recommendations of (Guo and Fraser 2009; Holmes 2013; Holmes 
and Olsen 2010) for small-sample propensity score methods. Balance was also 
assessed within each racial stratum (NH Whites, NH Blacks, Latinos, & Asians) and 
largely mirrored what is displayed above. However, balance was not achieved on the 
following covariates - for NH Blacks: Marital Status; for Latinos: Lives in MSA, 
Northeast, and West, and for Asians: Marital Status, SAT Score, Lives in Midwest, and 
Military Service. 
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